

An Ex-Soviet Officer Tells:

HOW RUSSIA BUILT THE NORTH KOREAN ARMY

The

Reporter

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September 26, 1950

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Korean Vignettes by San Bon Matsu

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RREPORTER'S NOTES

Station Identification

Every once in a while, a publication like ours should pause to identify itself—to tell its old and new readers what it stands for and what the time is.

This is the time when our country must take a stand for peace and define its pattern for peace, even while it is fighting a political war all over the world and a sample military war in one corner of the world. If we give in to the temptation of launching total war on Soviet Russia, we will break the coalition of nations on our side. If we submit to the enemy's provocation and fail to rearm, we will be inviting aggression on our own soil. *The Reporter* has often pointed out that Communist tactics have made peace and war indivisible in our time by fomenting civil war in every nation they have not yet conquered, and that now at long last we can separate peace from war by making our present system of alliances the nucleus of the future order of the world.

This is the time when the idea and the institutions of freedom have lost most of their radiance, when too many people all over the world are turning listless ears to highbrow or lowbrow generalizations about freedom. *The Reporter* thinks that there is concrete emergency work to be done here and now, in mapping out the economic and political measures that will revitalize free institutions wherever they are in danger.

Finally, this is the time when our American experiment in self-government and well-being can no longer be considered the odd privilege of the peo-

ple who happened to settle here; for it is an experiment that other nations can repeat if they wish, each at its own pace and in its own way. Perhaps this last is the major problem of our days, the one that *The Reporter* has tried hardest to tackle. The uniqueness of the American achievement often prevents our own as well as foreign people from realizing what it actually is: a pattern that, for all its shortcomings, is the best yet found to guarantee the health of the human race and the advance of civilization.

Where We Stand

The Reporter does not like to be called a middle-of-the-road magazine. To be in the middle of the road means to be at an equal distance from the extremes, and at their mercy. *The Reporter* dislikes the idea of standing halfway between, let's say, McCarthy and Marcantonio. If you always stick to the middle of the road, you can be crowded off by reckless drivers on either side.

When it comes to the institutions of freedom, *The Reporter* is extremely conservative, for it wants them to regain the vigor and appeal they had when they were first established. At the same time, it believes that democracy can be extended much farther than it already has—here and abroad—in such fields as international, labor, and race relations. In describing how our democratic institutions are run and how our policy and lawmakers behave, *The Reporter* tries first of all to understand objectively the facts as they are, even if some of them—for instance, that politicians care for votes, businessmen for profits, and labor leaders for power—

appear shocking to the naive. *The Reporter* does not expect every government on our side to have ancestors like Jefferson and Hamilton. But it protests as loudly as it can when Congressional leaders, in blind flurries of "realism," take to their heart the shadiest sort of anti-Communist riffraff.

The Reporter is every inch anti-Communist. It is as irritated by Stalin's tactics as it is bored by his theories. But it refuses to be mesmerized by the Communist danger, or to waste its energies psychoanalyzing the Communist mind. While fighting Communism it tries to look beyond it—to the world we are going to live in when the countries infected by the Communist poison are finally reabsorbed into our civil society. *The Reporter* does not believe that Communism can ever be our nemesis—unless our physical weakness and mental laziness make it so.

The Reporter is a young and optimistic magazine. It's a magazine that usually keeps its shirt on, but doesn't mince words when it gets angry. It tries as much as it can not to denounce what's wrong or utopian without pointing out what's right and feasible. It has strong principles, and it does not take a holiday from its principles every time it goes to press. It ranges wide in its interests, for frequently the most humble facts matter as much as the most spectacular.

The Reporter attempts to cover not everything that happens in the world, but everything that matters for fundamental purposes: building peace in these times of war, avoiding the pitfalls of warmongering and of peace mongering, and living up to the responsibilities that our nation has assumed as the pace-setter for the world.

In a Nutshell

The Reporter has found great strength in the support of its readers. It counts on the co-operation of the friends it has made to help make new ones. If our readers want to know in one sentence how to describe the magazine, here is the sentence: It is a magazine for the partisans of freedom. —MAX ASCOLI

Correspondence

Suckling Snake

To the Editor: In *The Reporter* for August 15, 1950, on page 18, in the first of several excerpts which *The Reporter* is to publish from the new book *The Watch*, which article is entitled "An Afternoon in a Roman Slum," a story is contained to the effect that a woman with a suckling baby, upon dozing off one day, awoke to find "a long gray thing with a flat head, staring eyes, and slender, cold tongue attached to her left breast. It was a snake. She was struck with horror to see the milk trickling into the snake's mouth . . ."

It seems incredible to me that a magazine like *The Reporter* would even republish such material from any source. It is biologically impossible for a snake to suckle. It has neither the equipment for suckling nor the ability to do so. A very superficial knowledge of the anatomy of a snake would be sufficient for one to know that a story of this nature is a complete fake.

Surely conditions in the Roman slums are bad enough without exaggerating them.

I have found your magazine very interesting and on the whole informative. Pre-publishing this type of material is neither.

MRS. ALICE LANGAN
Chicago, Illinois.

Economics and Union

To the Editor: J. H. Huizinga, in his article "Why Britain Says 'No' to Schuman," in your August 15 issue, says that Britain's refusal to join the Schuman program was based on the political and military risks involved in joining a Europe which has a large Communist element, and is too dangerously exposed and too rickety to be considered a good partner by John Bull. He goes on to say that this refusal may backfire on Britain if a successful United Europe emerges.

While Mr. Huizinga does mention Britain's plea that joining the Schuman program would upset its relations with the sister nations of the Commonwealth, I don't think he gives this reason enough weight, although he can hardly be blamed when the British themselves don't stress it much.

However, the British realize that while integrating means combining into one, you can't add $\frac{1}{2}$ plus $\frac{1}{2}$ plus $\frac{1}{2}$ and get one. And this, essentially, is what "integrating" western Europe, even with Britain, would be. Western Europe consists mainly of industrial nations. It must have sources of raw materials and markets in order to survive. Integrating western Europe without providing for these raw material sources and markets would solve fewer problems than it would create.

Britain, however, realizes its need for raw material sources and markets. It has these in the Commonwealth and has been drawing the Commonwealth in closer and closer since the war. It has given to these countries since the war an amount in "unrequited exports" roughly equivalent to the aid it has received under the Marshall Plan. These exports have consisted mostly in payments on the sterling balances Britain owed the Commonwealth countries for their help during the war and in long-term investments. It still owes them over 1.5 billion pounds, an effective chain to keep those countries demanding its "free" products rather than the products of some other country which would cost something.

So Britain has assured itself of its markets and raw material sources. But when western Europe finishes "integrating" and looks around, what will it find? It will discover that it will have to go into competition with the United States and Japan for the trade of the nations outside the Commonwealth. The increase in the efficiency of western Europe's industry brought about by the "integration" would hardly bring it up to an efficiency capable of competing with the United States, and the Japanese could undersell it on the basis of cheaper labor, so the only salvation for Europe would lie in a continual Marshall Plan.

Certainly such an economically insolvent

Europe could hardly overshadow in the Atlantic Community a Britain that was a going concern, either politically or militarily. The dependence of military and political power upon economic stability and production is rather self-evident in these days of the Marshall Plan.

Of course there are a number of factors which could change this picture, including: end of the cold war with attendant opening up of markets and raw material sources in eastern Europe and Asia; integration of all the western world's production centers, markets, and raw material sources to end the competition between the United States, Britain, Japan, and western Europe; the break-up of the Commonwealth; the breakdown of the British industrial machine; a Third World War, etc.

Mr. Huizinga intimates in his final paragraph that Britain gave up its chance to be a world power when it refused its chance to become the leading power in western European "integration," and through such a role one of the leading lights in the Atlantic Community. I think the reverse is true—that Britain will remain a world power through its leadership of the British Commonwealth, and through that role it will remain a leading light in the Atlantic Community—brighter even than a united western Europe.

FRED F. COOPER
Berkeley, California

Contributors

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The Editors

The Reporter

A FORTNIGHTLY OF FACTS AND IDEAS

September 26, 1950

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An ex-Soviet Officer Tells:

How Russia Built The North Korean Army

The following is the first installment of an article by a former Soviet officer, who came to the western side in 1949. The author, who served on the Soviet military mission in Korea, has written a book, The Soviet Marshals Speak to You, published in Paris last year.

Late in December, 1948, I found myself among a group of Russian officers aboard a Trans-Siberian Railway train going toward the Manchurian frontier and Korea. We were members of a special mission that the Kremlin had ordered to "form and train a new North Korean Army in not more than eighteen months," to replace our recently withdrawn occupation troops. We were a large group, occupying three entire sleeping cars. I was one of about

twenty lieutenant-colonels, majors, and captains, and there were a dozen colonels and five generals, including Kubanov, Katukov, Koroteyev, and Zakharov, as well as Shtikov, the Soviet ambassador to Pyongyang.

The decision to proceed with the organization of the new army had been taken at a conference in Moscow in mid-December, at which Marshal Bulganin presided. Among those present were Marshals Malinovsky, Vasilevsky, and Konev, and also Malenkov, Admiral Golovko (Chief of Staff of the Marines), representatives of Mao Tse-tung and of the Korean government, and representatives of the technical departments of the Red Army.

We travelers were in high spirits. An interesting job was ahead, we were among good companions, and the long trip seemed almost a holiday. A landslide held us up at Slioudiank station, on the south shore of Lake Baikal, for twenty-four hours, so that we had time for some winter sports and for eating great quantities of *kharius*, a delicious fish found only in Lake Baikal. Generals Katukov and Koroteyev distinguished themselves by their appetites, and by the quantity of 104-proof Siberian vodka that they absorbed.

Despite these distractions, most of the trip was spent in excited technical discussions. We had orders to go straight to work, and we did not yet

know what we would find in the way of men and matériel. The mission was well selected: Four generals were armored specialists; Zakharov belonged to the amphibious branch; among the colonels were secret intelligence specialists; the other officers were experts in transport and provisioning or in liaison, or were specialists on various types of arms. I had been assigned to the group as an artillery officer.

At the conference in Moscow, Marshal Bulganin had traced the principal lines along which the future North Korean Army was to be organized. It would have to be equipped with very modern armor, but the medium and heavy artillery was not to be motorized, because gas had to be reserved for the tanks. The air force was to be very limited.

We had picked a new medium tank, a variation of the T-34, weighing thirty-two tons instead of twenty-seven, and with armor that was particularly effective because of the use of a special alloy put into use by the Germans in 1944. The speed had been increased to

better than thirty miles an hour, and the armament consisted of one high-velocity 76-mm cannon and three heavy machine guns. These tanks were to comprise seventy-five per cent of the armored force; the remainder were to be heavy (or break through) tanks.


In the latter class we had substituted for the KV 1 (which weighed forty-four tons and was slow and difficult to maneuver) the KV 2, which we called a hybrid type, because it combined certain characteristics of the KV 1 and the German Tiger Royal Mark VI. This hybrid is armed with a 152-mm cannon, and its armor is thick enough—six inches—to make it practically invulnerable to any antitank gun of less than 90 mm. Its Diesel motor of eighteen cylinders and nine hundred horsepower permits its fifty-five tons to move at a good speed. The size of the future armored force of North Korea had been fixed at two armored divisions, with about five hundred tanks.

On the way, I had numerous conversations with Major Kalnin, a graduate of the Institute of Oriental Languages at Moscow, who spoke Chinese, Ko-

rean, and Japanese. He held several conferences to familiarize us with the human material with which we would be dealing. This was very important because one of our directives stipulated that the North Korean Army was to be organized chiefly with Koreans, and all commands were to go to them.

The Koreans themselves are for the most part a branch of the people inhabiting eastern Siberia. They are people of great bravery, as they proved several times in the course of the nineteenth century; in 1866 they repulsed the French, who tried to conquer Seoul, and in 1871 they faced an American punitive expedition with considerable courage.

According to Kalnin, the three ancient provinces of the North had always furnished the best Korean soldiers. The famous "tiger hunters" who had constituted the shock troops of the Korean kings had come from those areas. Armed with simple matchlock rifles, they had stood their ground well under direct artillery fire. "I believe that the North Korean Army, when it is well equipped and modernized, will be



Map by Starworth

Stopping places of the Russian mission to Korea

more formidable than the Japanese or Chinese armies," Kalnin said.

We believed that the agrarian reform, which distributed the land to the peasants and gave each a certificate of ownership, had satisfied the people's aspirations. "What has happened in South Korea?" I asked Kalnin. "Why hasn't that been done there?"

"Ri Sing Man [as the Russians call Syngman Rhee] did not wish to carry out this reform, apparently, because he didn't want to ape Pyongyang. The American General Hodge tried to convince him of the necessity of reform, but Ri would listen to nothing. He is so conceited that he is nicknamed 'the donkey of Seoul.' It is really surprising that the Americans chose him to head the government . . . Perhaps because he is not a thief, like the high officials of the Chinese Nationalist government."

Kalnin also informed us thoroughly about Korean ethnography. The Koreans are of three principal types: Mongol, Malayan, and European. The majority are of the continental Asian type, resembling the Buryat and Yakut Mongols. Twenty-five per cent look Malayan. Ten to fifteen per cent have quite light chestnut hair and blue eyes. "I remember," he said, "that at the Workers University in Moscow I met a Korean who could have been a twin of Major Pertzovitch, a member of our mission."

Some hours before we arrived at Chita I was called to General Katukov's compartment, where I found General Zakharov and Colonel Miaskov. We were to make out a list of questions to be discussed with the representatives of the government of the Buryat Republic and of Outer Mongolia. Ourem-Tzar, chief of staff to Marshal Choi-Balsan, President of the Ulan Bator Khoto government, was to participate in the discussions. The major point was to start the recruiting of tank experts and drivers for the North Korean Army. Full of the information I had gained from Kalnin, I tried to show that it would be useless to ask the Buryat Mongols to furnish us with the fifteen hundred specialists. These two republics had few skilled technicians.

But General Katukov was explicit: "We have received this order from Marshal Bulganin, and it must be ex-

ecuted." The old habits of Russian bureaucracy have not vanished: Everyone avoids responsibility, and it is rare to see anyone take the least initiative.

We spent nearly three hours working out the list of questions for discussion. We were arriving at Chita in the morning.

The conversations at Chita were shorter than I had expected, but we were at least in contact with men who were expert in war in these remote regions. Among our new acquaint-



ances were the chief of the Mongolian Army, General Maog Dan San, commander of the armored brigade that had defeated the Japanese in the Battle of the Lakes, who had been a student of Marshal Zhukov; the Russianized Mongol Colonel Yvan Damaiev; and several Buryat officers, with Major General Melnikov.

General Katukov explained our plans to them briefly, indicating the number of tank experts and driver-technicians who were to be sent to North Korea. They must have had five years' experience, a secondary education, must belong to the Revolutionary-Populist Party, and be able to make themselves understood in Russian. In view of the lack of Korean manuals, and the absence in the Korean tongue of numerous technical terms, it had been decided that all technical terms would be taken directly from the Russian. The Mongol officers caviled at the number of soldiers trained in armored warfare that we intended to take, but Katukov swiftly overrode their objections.

At Harbin, Manchuria, where our train arrived in the afternoon, we were

met at the station by General Ma Ling Dao, head of the military section of the Administrative Committee of the Province of Heilungkiang. We were told that that night two representatives of the North Korean government, Generals Li Man Ka and Kim San Pen (who were called generals probably for courtesy's sake), would arrive at Harbin.

The next day, as we headed for the Russian-Chinese-Korean conference, we noticed as we crossed the town that there was great animation, that the stores were full of Russian, German, English, and Japanese merchandise—but that the prices were exorbitant.

Our meeting place was a surprise: a large motor barge, armed with machineguns and pompously called "The Gunboat." It was anchored in the Sungari River, some ten kilometers below Harbin.

In a long, narrow cabin we were seated around a table, which was covered by a beautiful green cloth embroidered with dragons, bees, and lotus blossoms. Its splendor was so unexpected that we inquired as to its origin, for it was a true museum piece. They told us it came from the palace of Marshal Chang Tsolin, at Mukden. The Japanese General Tarosani had seized it when the palace was pillaged, and in capturing Tarosani and his staff the troupes of General Ma had recovered the precious cloth. The ancient tapestry was now present at the birth of the North Korean Army.

The Korean generals spoke Russian fairly well, as did General Ma, so we dispensed with interpreters. General Kubanov explained briefly the objective of our mission and our basic principles. He added that we wished to inspect the Korean units that had fought in China and that were at present in Manchuria. General Ma replied that the Chinese command wished to send a few generals to North Korea because the Revolutionary War Committee was in Pyongyang negotiating a Chinese-Korean military alliance. Kubanov rejected this proposition—such questions would have to be discussed in Moscow; here we were only concerned with technical questions.

The Chinese accepted this with their usual impassivity. Then Ma said that the Korean units in Manchuria could not be released before March 1, 1949.

The remnants of Nationalist detachments still had to be cleared out of Manchuria. In particular, he said that in the Kirin region, where the Korean units were located, pockets of Nationalist resistance still existed.

Our representatives were opposed to this. According to our instructions, the organization of Korean units was to be finished as swiftly as possible, and the divisions stationed in Kirin were to form the core of the future army. Naturally Li Man Ka and Kim San

Pen supported our generals. Then General Kubanov asked for precise information on the Korean units.

"We have here twenty to twenty-two thousand men," Ma replied. "Three-quarters are Manchurian Koreans; the rest came from the Russian Army and Korea. They are grouped in five divisions, each of four thousand men. These are reduced divisions. The Koreans are in charge up to the rank of battalion commander, above which thirty-five to forty-five per cent of the

officers are Chinese, plus a few Mongols from Jehol."

Answering questions as to the arms of these units, Ma indicated that they had some seventy-five assault tanks of medium tonnage and different types, and that the artillery was almost exclusively of Japanese manufacture, as were the Hotchkiss-type machine guns. All of these had been seized at the time of the Japanese Army's surrender, either by Ma's armies or by Chiang Kai-shek's Nationalists.

In the evening at the Grand Hotel, where we were staying, we studied with Kalnin the region to which we were going. Harbin itself had been founded exactly fifty years ago. The Trans-Siberian Railway had transformed it from a hamlet of thirty persons to a city of more than half a million inhabitants. Kirin, where we were going to see the first Korean units, is the largest city of the upper Sungari, and also a river port—the only one of any importance on the Chinese side of the Amur.

To reach Kirin we had to make a difficult trip in cars that jolted dangerously over bad roads. The autos were Mercedeses, Lincolns, and others that had belonged to the IV Corps of the Japanese Army.

Twelve miles from Kirin we came upon a great fortress built by the Japanese. Part fort, part barracks, it was surrounded by barbed wire, and defended by moats, towers of reinforced concrete, and thick ramparts.

After the surrender of Japan, Chinese Nationalists had remained there for more than two years, repulsing attacks by General Ma's Red troops. They were defeated only with the help of the Koreans, who then moved in.

Our tank experts began at once to inventory the armored matériel. My colleagues recognized Japanese variants of the German Mark IV, types similar to the French "Somua," Japanese Inu ("Dog") tanks—very low, with 76-mm cannon—a dozen old-type Shermans, a few Skodas of comparatively recent make, some German Mark III's in sorry condition, and some old-type Soviet T-34's.

The cannon and the light arms were equally heterogeneous. It was clear that the question of equipping the Korean units had presented a real problem, which had been solved in the same



way it was in China. It is known that some of the needed munitions had been bought from Chiang's generals in the midst of the battles for Mukden and Kirin.

Our mission moved on practically in a body to the Polygon, a maneuver ground a few miles from the fortress; we were all impatient to see the Koreans at work. On the whole we were agreeably surprised. Despite a low level of technical training, the gunners were not lacking in skill, and many of the officers were quite equal to their tasks. Moreover, Colonel Li Guiken, commandant of the Polygon, was a former student at the Artillery School in Moscow, as were his assistants, Lieutenant Colonel Khon and Major Pak.

The next day I saw the armor in action. It was a sorry sight. The dissimilar tanks maneuvered with no co-ordination; often they broke down because of their poor condition. Orders given to sections were poorly executed. It was obvious that a great deal of the equipment could not meet the requirements of a really modern force. I began to think that the figure of fifteen hundred technicians, as set at the Moscow conference, could not be adequate.

On the other hand, we were well satisfied with the small-arms, automatic-weapons, and infantry exercises. The precision in firing automatic rifles, submachine guns, and machine guns was almost equal to that of our own best regiments. The infantry was extremely skillful in the art of camouflage, in taking advantage of the terrain, and in successive advances under enemy fire, and had learned well from experience the great importance of digging foxholes quickly, no matter how rudimentary the holes.

One small incident enlivened the proceedings. A practice shell fell on a small wooden shed. A pack of dogs of every color and size burst forth, and most of our North Korean Army-to-be, including the officers, raced after them, shooting at them. We learned that the dogs were an important food reserve. They were to be used on a Korean holiday to prepare a national dish called *Moruki*.

After five days' maneuvers, General Kubanov called us together to sum up our conclusions. He proposed that the units we had inspected should be used as the nucleus for the shock troops of

the future army. According to him, the army would be made up of six divisions of infantry, for the formation of which the five reduced divisions at Kirin would be a sufficient framework; the aforementioned two armored divisions; besides these shock troops a maneuvering force, composed of eight first-line divisions, well equipped and well trained; and a reserve force of eight divisions, to be made up of territorial troops—the time for whose training would not be more than ten months.

General Zakharov voiced the opinion that it would be equally necessary to set up an amphibious force; but Kubanov, firm in his precise instructions, of which we did not yet know the terms, retorted that we must not disperse our efforts and that the decision of the "authoritative body"—the Politburo—was clear: We must act as swiftly as possible and devote ourselves to creating an army. We finally got several vague explanations of something for which I had not yet found the justification: Why, in preparing a modern army for North Korea, were we to do nothing to organize an air force?

Colonel Zurov posed the question of the necessity of creating a strong air



force as an essential of any modern war. Kubanov, to close the discussion, told him that the matter had been settled elsewhere.

Kubanov later told me: "Because of political considerations, we cannot organize a Korean air force that will correspond in importance to the armor of the future army. The representative

of the Central Committee of the Korean Communist Party had tried to obtain a sufficient air force from the authoritative body. But its demands have not been taken into consideration, and Moscow has already foreseen that at Pyongyang they will try to wangle from our mission, by devious means, a sizable air force. But we must not yield to this maneuver."

At the end of this meeting I spoke with General Zakharov, whom I had known well during the defense of Sevastopol. I asked him frankly what the reasons were for the Politburo's stubbornness in this matter. He smiled, and patted my shoulder:

"We must be prudent with these Koreans. We are going to form a modern army, capable of maneuvering and striking. But we must not act like the sorcerer's apprentice, so that one day this force might upset our game in the Far East. If the Koreans got a strong air force, together with a good armored army, they would be able to reach Pusan quickly, and to attack the strongest fortifications in the straits separating Korea from Japan. They could then repeat in reverse the famous Japanese leapfrog, across these straits which are dotted with islands, and, by way of Tsushima reach Shimonoseki and Sasebo.

"That would mean war with the United States. We are not interested in provoking such a war. Technically, it would not be difficult to give them a thousand planes, especially since there is no lack of pilots. There were close to five hundred in the Chinese Army."

Conversations with the other generals enabled me to understand our political-military thesis. Without Korea, Vladivostok and Port Arthur have no military value. But we had no intention of transforming Korea into a bastion for an offensive in the Pacific.

"Then have we decided to stabilize the situation in the Pacific along the Korean line?" I asked my chief.

"We don't know anything about that. We have a strictly defined technical military mission to accomplish. Time will tell."

Some days later we left the Kirin region. At Antung, on the Korean frontier, a train awaited us. It was to take us to Pyongyang, the North Korean capital.

—KYRIL KALINOV

How We Built The South Korean Republic

The author of this article was U. S. civil administrator under the military governor of Korea in the first months of occupation.

Very soon after we of the occupation forces arrived in Korea, a message that had originated in the State Department asked whether we desired the return of Dr. Syngman Rhee and his group. None of us knew anything about Dr. Rhee except that for many years he had been the nominal head of the "Korean Provisional Government" in exile, most recently in Washington, where he had lobbied for his group's recognition. After some discussion with our political advisers—State Department officials who accompanied the military forces—I answered that we would consent to Dr. Rhee's return as an individual only, not as a representative of any "government." Soon afterward we received notice that Dr. Rhee and his group would come.

The news met a varied response in the Korean press. Leftist papers asked why he was being brought back, and termed him a "tool of the imperialists"; more moderate papers praised Rhee highly and expressed the hope he would be able to accomplish unification of the many groups who were contending for political recognition. Lieutenant General John R. Hodge had first viewed Dr. Rhee's return with some alarm, but within a few days after his arrival he decided that Dr. Rhee was the man on whom he would rely for uniting South Korea's people.

As part of his program he encouraged a celebration in the capital, Seoul, at which Dr. Rhee was the principal speaker. So many people turned out for the parade and the speech from the Capitol steps that loudspeakers had to be placed on the adjoining streets. Even the roofs were crowded. When Dr. Rhee spoke I was mystified at the



reaction of the crowd. They remained absolutely quiet throughout. Were they sullen, or were Koreans customarily phlegmatic? The solution was furnished next day, when we were informed that Dr. Rhee had been away so long that the crowd understood little of his Korean.

Another incident in which Dr. Rhee figured occurred a few weeks later. The military government had many serious economic and political problems to solve—rice collection, land reform, inflation, resumption of industry, expansion of coal mines, and the creation of a Korean advisory group. Since General Hodge was obviously placing so much confidence in Dr. Rhee, General Archibald V. Arnold, the Military Governor, suggested to me that Dr. Rhee should be brought in to give us advice on these problems as well as acquaint the people with what had to be done.

At General Arnold's request I arranged a conference at which the head of each department of the military government would present his problems. The first officer called on was the Director of the Department of Agriculture. After listening for about five minutes, Dr. Rhee interrupted and,

looking toward me, complained that all these troubles would have been avoided if the State Department had recognized his "Provisional Government." I tried to get the discussion back on a relevant footing, but Rhee kept up his indictment of American foreign policy. Ultimately the discussion was called off.

At other meetings I had with Dr. Rhee, he pursued the same topic. It was obvious that Dr. Rhee had no liking for or faith in our State Department. After I returned to the United States, I found that the feeling was entirely mutual.

It was into this man's hands that General Hodge delivered the molding of American policy in Korea. In this he took full responsibility, over the State Department's protests.

In fairness to Dr. Rhee, it must be said that he was sincere and that he was able to gather around him many unselfish, well-educated Koreans. His age and his stubbornness have been his chief handicaps.

Dr. Rhee had to fight Communism from many sources. There was a constant influx of Communist agents from the north with unlimited funds. As recently as last May, four hundred Korean ex-soldiers of the Japanese Army, thoroughly indoctrinated in Communist ideology, were returned to South Korea from the north. Guerrilla warfare was prevalent, and squabbles among the other parties continually strengthened the Communists. Such difficulties took the major part of the government's time.

One of the most confusing situations at the beginning of the occupation was Russian-American relationships. In August, 1945, General Hodge and I went from Okinawa to General MacArthur's headquarters at Manila to

obtain information and instructions on the movement to Korea. I conferred with the military-government section while General Hodge conferred with General MacArthur and his chief of staff. Definite information was impossible to obtain. The question foremost in General Hodge's mind at that time was that of our relationship with the Russians. Both of us were informed that absolutely nothing had come from Washington on this subject and that we would therefore maintain local liaison along the 38th parallel.

The 38th-parallel border was a purely military expedient. Shortly before the armistice with Japan in August, 1945, Russian troops had begun to move toward the Manchurian-Korean border. They crossed it on August 12. Korea was held by a fully equipped veteran Japanese Army, which could have put up strong resistance if it had disregarded the Emperor's orders to lay down its arms and submit to demobilization. American troops in Okinawa, the nearest point, were limited in number and battle-worn. Initially only one division with some attached troops was available for the Korean occupation. Therefore, it was apparent in Washington that unless some arbitrary boundary was created, Russian troops could occupy all Korea before the arrival of the American troops on September 8. Thus, the demarcation line was forced upon us by our own logistic and personnel problems, as well as by our error in encouraging Russia to enter the war against Japan.

Our landing took place at Inchon, the port for Seoul. There we and the Japanese conferred on the surrender ceremony to take place in the capital. After the conference General Hodge directed me to go immediately to Seoul, to meet a small advance party that would arrive by air. I rode twenty-odd miles on a road lined with Koreans who conveyed a feeling of reverence and hushed expectancy on this day of deliverance.

At the Hotel Chosen in Seoul the atmosphere, in contrast, was one of confusion and irritation. One of our higher officers had taken upon himself the duty of establishing friendly relations with the Russians. He had accompanied them about the city, and then proceeded to have a dinner for the Russian consul, his staff, and their

bosomy wives, at which it was evident he had consumed a good deal of cheer. The scorn with which they regarded Americans was evident on their faces. It was a shock to realize how near Russia was and how familiar the Russian representatives were with this strange land.

For centuries Russia has regarded Korea as within its sphere of influence. The Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905 decided the issue in favor of Japan, but even after the Communist Revolution of 1917, the Russians looked to the East for expansion. Editorials and articles in Communist literature were quick to point out that the great field for Communism lay among the peasant classes in China, Manchuria, and Korea.

It was not until August, 1945, that Russia entered the war against Japan.



Before that, as we advanced island by island, Russia had remained neutral, maintaining an embassy in Japan and a large consulate in Seoul. Under the very noses of the Japanese secret police the Russians had organized large groups of Koreans into militant political action committees, known collectively as the "People's Republic," ready to spring into the open the moment the war ended.

The People's Republic was strong and well organized throughout South Korea, and was in operation from the very start of our occupation. The real leaders were, of course, Communist Party members. Other Koreans had joined to resist the Japanese and hasten independence.

When the U.S. 7th Division landed, its immediate mission was to supervise Japanese demobilization and movement to Pusan for evacuation to Japan. Physically, the division could occupy only the city of Seoul, with small detachments in the main province. At that time our military-government group was very small and was mainly concerned with establishing a local régime at the national level. The rest of the American Zone temporarily became a political vacuum in which the "People's Republic" assumed the complete functions of government. Although the People's Republic was controlled by Moscow, it contained some conscientious and patriotic citizens. Our own military government and the administration eventually established by the Koreans had an extremely hard time separating Soviet underlings from patriotic citizens. Top leaders who sought to escape the Communists' tentacles were assassinated, while those smaller fry who could escape were looked upon with extreme suspicion.

An outstanding example was Lyuh Woon Hyung, the editor of a Korean paper, whom the Japanese had kept in solitary confinement for five years for his nationalistic views. A man of great intellect, he learned to speak and write English while in prison. After his release, he was induced to become nominal head of the "People's Republic."

His representatives came aboard ship as we lay at anchor off Inchon. Since only the Japanese could have known our exact whereabouts, we suspected that Lyuh's group was pro-Japanese. Subsequently the Japanese



head of police told us that Lyuh had been regarded as the most powerful Korean leader, and had been paid a large sum of money by the Japanese to guarantee against a Korean uprising prior to our arrival. He had accepted the money with alacrity and utilized it for the organization of the People's Republic. When General Hodge learned that Lyuh had taken money from the Japanese, he dismissed the Korean as a grafter and a crook. Eventually in 1947 Lyuh was assassinated—probably by the Communists.

Early in the occupation it became evident that the People's Republic was a strong minority, trained in violence, and that it would not co-operate with the American military authorities. Its early strength throughout South Korea arose from the ignorance of the people, their hatred of the Japanese, and their fear of terrorism, rather than from any basic social-reform program. As our military-government units moved into the cities and towns, they met various situations. In some instances, the members of the "Republic" immediately surrendered their authority and worked closely with the American personnel. In others, they openly defied the military government, rioted, and terrorized the people, killed the police, and resisted all attempts to resume normal operation of industry. In the city of Mokpo, which I visited in December, 1945, we found a doctor heading the local party group. He was then acting as mayor under military government. His sole reason for joining the movement had been to assist in establishing orderly government. He was definitely not a Communist. There were others in the same category. It was difficult, if

not impossible, to distinguish the Reds from the pinks. Any attempt at such sorting was viewed with suspicion by General Hodge. By the very nature of his training and background, he saw even the lightest shade of pink as Red. Thus the pattern was made in the earliest stages of the occupation.

The real test with Lyuh came when military-government personnel landed in sufficient numbers to establish local government. It was evident that the People's Republic would have to be disbanded, and Lyuh several times promised me he would disband the organization. As each promise was broken, he became more and more baffled by the noncompliance with his orders; the organization he had built had run away from him. Later the Koreans named him the "Silver Hatchet" (a beautiful blade with no cutting edge).

Tragically, General Hodge's choice lay between Lyuh and Rhee. Would he support Lyuh, tied to the Communists, or Rhee, patriotic and evidently capable of obtaining the loyalty of good men? He had little choice.

It is important to emphasize that there is no distinctive difference between South Koreans and North Koreans, and that as a boundary the 38th parallel has no geographical, political, or ethnical meaning. Koreans throughout Korea speak one language, though with some difference in accent. The Japanese did their best to stamp out Korean culture, prohibit the teaching of the Korean language, and impose Shintoism as the official state religion. The Shinto shrine at Seoul was deserted as soon as the Japanese depart-

ed. Americans visited it out of curiosity, but I never saw a Korean there. The traditions and languages of the Korean people had been carefully handed down within the family unit. The Christians, brought up in missionary schools, are a strong influence. They are mostly middle-class people—landowners, lawyers, teachers, and small businessmen. In many respects they are the intelligentsia of the country. Humbled under the Japanese, they understand better than any group the meaning of freedom and democracy. All those I met regarded Syngman Rhee highly at that time.

The majority of Koreans were so used to being clubbed that our moderate policy was interpreted by many as a sign of weakness. A failure on our part to understand this facet of Oriental character is perhaps our greatest source of misconception of Oriental government and tradition. The Asian peoples have no Magna Charta. When we protected Japanese lives it was totally beyond the comprehension of the Koreans. The concept of human values, of the rights of man and of the dignity of the individual, is beyond their general understanding. Democracy, as we know it, cannot be established among them in a short time.

The government that came into being under the U.N. Commission has been called a rightist police state. The term "rightist," as we understand it, is definitely a misnomer. There is no Right in Korea from the viewpoint of personal and party platforms. All parties and personalities advocated programs farther left than any that could be successful in the United States. And if Rhee's government was a police state,

members of his party could hardly have been defeated in the May, 1950, election.

One of the great sources of dissatisfaction with Rhee's régime was his pay-as-you-go program of high taxes. Rhee realized that an election would defeat his party and overturn what he believed to be a sound government. A politician in the Orient is no different than in other parts of the world. He can be a hero one day and a dog the next. In addition, the followers of the assassinated Kim Koo, who was an assassin in his own right, and those of the ailing Kimm Kiu Sic were certain to vote against Rhee. Both groups demanded the unification of the country and the removal of the Russian and American military missions.

The "Korea-for-the-Koreans" program reminds me of a dinner conversation I had with Kimm Kiu Sic at my home in Seoul. He dwelt on the withdrawal of the Americans from Korea. "All foreigners should leave Korea alone to work out her own destiny; she is capable of solving her own problems," he said. "If the Korean leaders and the people feel that way, I am sorry that we undertook the job," I answered. "Our government would be glad to know of this attitude and to be relieved of the responsibility of establishing democracy in Korea."

"You do not understand," replied Kimm Kiu Sic. "What I am saying is for political consumption, it does not represent my own wishes. I hope you Americans will stay always."

The gravest problem in Korea is land reform. Any success the Communists have had with the people is due to their propaganda on this subject. On our arrival we found that more than two-thirds of the land was in large tracts. The infamous Oriental Development Company, Japanese-owned and -operated, held ninety thousand acres of rice land and twenty-eight thousand acres of dry fields, and was constantly expanding through foreclosures of usurious mortgages. The rest was owned by Japanese and Korean landlords, who lived in the cities. Eighty per cent of these rice lands and sixty-four per cent of the dry lands were in the South of the peninsula.

All Japanese holdings became the property of the military government by a proclamation issued shortly after

the landing. Korean owners kept their land. These individual owners made up a large part of the educated classes within Korea, and most of their estates had been in the families for many generations. One of General Hodge's first acts was to cut the tenants' rent from more than one-half the crop to one-third, thus shattering a time-honored custom.

In North Korea, it was rumored that all lands of absentee landlords were being confiscated, and the North Ko-



rean radio made this promise to the tenants. No concrete evidence of what was taking place was obtained until 1946.

In the meantime, however, agitators in South Korea, citing what the Russians were supposedly doing, demanded the immediate free distribution of Japanese lands and the confiscation of Korean absentee landlords' estates.

Land reform was a problem that required advice and direction from Washington, but we got none. I spent many hours with our agriculture people and legal section attempting to work out the details for the sale of the Japanese lands, but all lacked appeal. The tenants continued to work the land and made no move to buy it. We had neither the personnel nor the training to enforce the procedure. There was an ordinance on the books; that was all.

In the meantime in North Korea all holdings of over twelve acres were confiscated, and distributed among farmers selected by the local "people's committees." This program naturally received widespread publicity throughout Korea. What the people did not realize was that title was never vested in an individual owner, but rather that he became a tenant of the local com-

mittee. It was a perfect patronage system: The local chairman had absolute control of every farmer's vote. Later it developed that taxes levied upon the "owners" in North Korea exceeded former rents.

In accordance with our own "wait-and-see" policy, the Japanese lands were turned over to a Korean National Land Administration in 1948, and the Koreans themselves were handed the problem of distribution. Sale of these lands commenced immediately, a step that added to the dissatisfaction of tenants working for Korean absentee landlords.

Most Korean landlords realized the inevitability of land distribution, but they fought tooth and nail for the highest price.

It would be inconceivable and contrary to American principles to take land without just compensation, and it was quite proper that this point receive consideration in the legislature. It was further inevitable that the landlord interests had a powerful influence in the assembly. Thus there could be no quick solution.

It was not until November, 1949, that the question of payment was finally decided. The Act passed by the Assembly called for the issuance of national bonds. The owner was to be paid in them on a basis of 150 per cent of one year's crop value, and the new owner would pay the government for his purchase on a five-year-payment contract.

It is unfortunate that the war has stopped this program. It is unfortunate, too, that a solution was not reached earlier. Land reform could have been accomplished earlier had we not expected to co-ordinate our efforts with the Russians.

Criticism is also being made of the withdrawal of our troops in 1948. As early as 1945, practically all our soldiers in Korea, and their families at home, were demanding an end to the occupation. Korea is an extremely difficult country in which to quarter American troops. To the American soldier in peacetime, Korea was the end of the earth. Along with house-keeping problems, there was the shortage of troops, to say nothing of ever-present friction with the native population. Terminating the occupation was a wise move. If our troops had been in

South Korea at the start of the invasion, they would have been badly mauled, with a consequent serious loss of face for us throughout the entire Orient.

Our gravest error, again part of our policy of not offending the Russians, was in not preparing and training an adequate, well-balanced army in South Korea. Shortly before his death, I discussed this question with Major General Archer L. Lerch, then military governor. His concept was that of an army of military police battalions rather than of divisions. This idea was modified, but the principle of a defensive army still remained. As late as last November, Korean representatives in this country told me of their need for planes, but my inquiries revealed that no planes were being sent because they might possibly be used offensively across the border.

Our cost and effort in the Korean experience have been tremendous; excluding occupational costs, between September, 1945, and October, 1949, we spent more than \$524 million in Korea, not counting the equipment we left there. Since the outbreak of hostilities, we have poured out other millions, lost many soldiers, and destroyed much of what was built in the last five years.

But we cannot think of Korea solely in terms of American dollars. There are people involved—some thirty million of them, equaling a fifth of the population of the United States, in an area the size of Kansas. These pleasant, hard-working, industrious people, who want to live in peace, traditionally maintain a simple, gregarious relationship, many in communities where each family helps the unfortunate members of the clan, and where public relief is at an absolute minimum. Into South Korea, which prior to the occupation had approximately sixteen million people, there have poured, since the occupation began, roughly three million Koreans from China, Japan, and island colonies, as well as an additional two million from North Korea. These people have been able to carry on for the past two years despite all Communist attempts to destroy their system. The North Korean attack would not have come had Russia believed it could form its own type of government short of war.

—BRAINARD PRESCOTT

Shattered Showcase Of the ECA



Paul Hoffman, the relatively shock-proof administrator of the Economic Cooperation Administration, said recently: "The Korean War came to me as a terrific shock—a special kind of shock. On the basis of my personal knowledge, as well as on reports from Korea, I had had high hope that that country was becoming a successful showcase for the democratic economy in Asia."

Mr. Hoffman's special kind of shock was shared by all the Americans, in ECA and the Army, who had worked from 1945 until June 25, 1950, to lay the substructure on which economic and political democracy might grow in Korea. When its Asian showcase was broken, the entire ECA program was suddenly and seriously challenged. Wittingly or unwittingly, a good many commentators joined the Communist cry that our efforts in Korea had been a total failure—that we had not succeeded in building a régime that would defend itself against aggressors. The fact that both the State Department and the Pentagon had placed Korea outside the geographic line of our "strategic commitments" raised the question, in and out of Congress, whether we should have given any economic aid at all to South Korea. Obviously, in Korea we had not accomplished the principal mission of our foreign policy: stopping Communist aggression. What had we done in Korea, anyhow?

Neither the ECA nor the Army will

answer that question as long as our troops are still far south of the 38th parallel. Nevertheless, some of the essential facts are available now, and they should certainly be better known.

When the U. S. Army entered Korea in September, 1945, the paramount problem there was political. Until it was annexed by Japan in 1910, Korea had been a typical Oriental monarchy. Under the total rule of the Japanese, the Koreans were not allowed any trace of national self-government; they could not even form political parties.

The United States took over half a nation honeycombed with hundreds of anti-Japanese and usually revolutionary underground groups, many of them Marxist, plus thousands of would-be political leaders. When the Army attempted to register the political parties, it found more than four hundred.

The Army's first step was an attempt to mold something resembling a government. It was slow, tricky work. For the first year, Americans handled all the jobs the Japanese had held—provincial governors, department and bureau heads, presidents of banks, businesses, and industries. But every American worked with a hand-picked Korean successor looking over his shoulder. The Koreans learned so quickly that by September, 1946, the military government was able to take a bold step calculated to catch the eye of all Asia. All offices in Korea except that of military governor were turned over to Koreans, and the Americans became their advisers.

In the summer of 1946, General Hodge and the late General Lerch decided to establish a ninety-man Interim Legislative Assembly which would give the Koreans a voice in matters of policy. Half of the group was elected, half appointed. The election results



announced early in November, 1946, were highly controversial; because of the patriarchal character of the Korean community all the winners were conservatives. The Army's appointments were better balanced: seventeen conservatives, fifteen moderates, and twelve left-wingers. One general later explained at a Congressional hearing, "If we had not appointed [these men] we would have been accused of having a very reactionary legislature," to which Representative Walter Judd of Minnesota replied: "That is, we decided what is democratic after they had decided democratically what they wanted."

In the meantime, the South Korean courts, prisons, and prosecutors' offices had all been staffed with Koreans. With the appointment of a Korean civil administrator, whose only American boss was the military governor, the South Korean Interim Government came into being. Promptly, the Interim Government, assisted by a staff of American advisers and fought bitterly by the Communists, got to work repatriating some three million Koreans from China, the Ryukyus, Formosa, North Korea, and Japan. Then it began the work of reconstruction.

Korea was less disorganized economically than politically. The Japanese had controlled ninety-five per cent of the businesses, and our military government was able to take them over as going concerns. The enormous Oriental Development Company, for example, controlled a fifth of the paddy-land in Korea and at least twenty-four

industrial companies in South Korea. Farms, banks, insurance companies, mines, textile mills, fisheries, railroads, utilities, and industries were turned over intact (although often in miserable disrepair) by the Japanese. Best of all, the South Korean economy could run for a time on leftover Japanese inventories and stockpiles.

But these early blessings were soon outweighed by difficulties. The Army found no Koreans were trained to take over the administrative jobs. The Japanese had been thorough imperialists: In 1944, there had been 52,000 Japanese managers and professional or technical experts. All 51,000 skilled jobs on Korea's railroads had been held by Japanese. Some Koreans had been allowed to practice medicine or law, but none got as high as shop foremen in industry. Two-thirds of the employable Koreans were farmers—many of them tenants who paid their Japanese landlords about sixty per cent of their yearly crops. The rest were employed in handicraft production, small shop-keeping, semiskilled industrial work, or coolie labor. The Japanese had indeed built a rich and complex industrial-agricultural empire in Korea. But when they were expelled, there was no one left to run it. Inexperienced Koreans had to be hustled into top jobs, with the result that hundreds of people went through the motions of running businesses, or jockeyed for position, while production dwindled to the vanishing point. Besides, the ablest Koreans all wanted to be in government, since in Korea it is a much greater honor to be a bureaucrat than a busi-



nessman or technician. Another problem had to do with the fierce anti-Japanese feeling. It caused Koreans to destroy much machinery that they felt was a symbol of Japanese imperialism.

Nor did Korea's economic problems end there. The Korean economy had been closely integrated with those of Japan and Manchuria; it was now deprived of the semi-manufactured commodities, repair parts and replacements, and markets and outlets which the old Japanese Empire had supplied. We had to fill the breach quickly.

A systematic land-reform program could not be launched immediately, primarily because the Koreans thought it was a job for their future government, but the Army did get off to a start. First, it reduced the rents paid by tenant farmers. Later, military government sold 700,000 acres of former Japanese-owned land to 588,000 tenants on a liberal-payments plan.

The revival of Korean industry was something the Americans could do more about. Hundreds of machine shops stood idle. Coal mines were flooded. How could a cement factory get into operation, for example, when its machinery was worn out? How could a power plant containing ruined Japanese and German machinery be reactivated when no one had blueprints? Or a paper mill reconditioned when the felts and screens were frayed?

Americans, in and out of the Army, responded with all the ingenuity they had. They made paper-mill felts out of Army blankets; they patiently showed Korean electricians how to repair equipment; they crawled around miserable mine openings and explained how to drain the mines; they taught the use of bulldozers and carryalls to load coal into gondola cars. A great deal of work was done by Americans purely on their own initiative. One contributed a prize-winning bull to improve Korean herds, and another brought in, at his own expense, seven hundred dollars' worth of clover seed to check erosion on hillsides.

The first long steps toward South Korean recovery were taken while the United States, through its Army administrators, was still responsible for the country. This formal responsibility ended with the U.N.-sponsored elections of May, 1948, and the establishment of the government of the Re-

public of Korea in August of the same year. Just before the election, the Communists, whose South Korean membership had been falling steadily since the early days of the occupation, staged meetings protesting the election and warned citizens not to appear at the polls. Nevertheless, some eighty per cent of the eligible South Korean voters registered, and ninety per cent of those voted.

Communist opposition was not taken lightly in South Korea. Two attempts by the Joint American-Russian Commission to Unify North and South Korea had failed because the Communists would settle for nothing less than control of South Korea. In South Korea, Communists had dynamited bridges and attempted to organize nation-wide strikes. The North Koreans, who had most of the electric-power plants in the country, cut off the electrical supply at the 38th parallel. To meet this emergency, the Americans and South Koreans rushed several shut-down thermal electric plants into operation, brought in a power ship and barge, and lived by candlelight for months.

The relaxation of military control did not mean that the United States considered South Korea a walking case. The Army had seen the country through the initial crisis. But the long pull toward full recovery lay ahead. It was time for the specialist. This is where the ECA came in.

The ECA was new in that part of the world—a huge and fast-moving organization of economic trouble-shooters whose assigned task was to help restore foreign nations to business health. In Korea, however, it had to begin warily. Its powers—other than the right to refuse to countersign checks—were indefinite. Eyes were upon it, East and West. In Central and Southeast Asia, suspicion of American motives ran high. We might refer to ourselves, satirically, as “Uncle Sap,” but to many Asians, we were a white, capitalist power that had been, and still was, closely allied to the “colonial exploiters” of Europe. Asia could understand the clean-cut position of an occupation army. But the ECA was a civilian something-or-other which might simply be a new form of imperialism.

It set out to prove it was not. Every detail of the aid to come was worked

out with thirty top officials of the South Korean government. ECA's Food and Agriculture, Transportation, and Industry branches were called into consultation, as were the U. S. Bureau of Mines, the Army Engineer Corps, and the economic staff of the State Department. When the ECA finally sat down to draw up the agreements on aid, there



was nothing to suggest either imperialism or an idle giveaway program.

In preliminary talks, the ECA agreed to put up recovery money, but to reserve reasonable veto power over how it was spent. The ECA was particularly interested in South Korea's future earnings of foreign exchange from exports. It was agreed that whatever foreign money the country should receive would be used for the joint Korean-American rehabilitation program. This was the only real control the United States continued to hold.

In January, 1949, South Korea's greatest need was fertilizer. But the manufacture of fertilizer depended on electric power, which in turn depended on coal. So the ECA started with coal. By the end of the year, Korean coal production had increased to five times its 1946 level and electric power was up

to seventy-three per cent of what it had been before the North Korean power cutoff. With many thousand tons of fertilizer meanwhile imported from the United States, South Korea was able not only to feed itself but to export a hundred thousand metric tons of rice by the spring of 1950. The ECA had estimated that South Korea could pay its own way once its exports had reached \$75 million. Before the North Korean invasion, it was expected that exports would reach \$52 million in 1951.

In one year, South Korean production of forty-four basic commodities almost doubled. By 1950, the production of coal had increased 306 per cent over 1946; cotton yarn, 222 per cent; electrical equipment, 191 per cent. Figuring in metric tons, the production of brown rice was up 380,000 tons over 1945, other cereal production up 280,000 tons, potatoes and fruits almost a million tons. Part of this swift rise (the tripling of cotton-textile production, for example) was directly due to raw-material imports from the United States. But such a flood of Korean energy was loosed with the arrival of independence that it is impossible to tell where the ECA and where the Koreans should take credit.

By 1950, a hundred thousand Korean civil servants and a few hundred American advisers were operating across the whole South Korean economy—in agriculture, mining, public health, transportation, and education. Farms were producing enough to sustain twenty million people and still leave a good balance for export. Railroads were being repaired and a hundred new locomotives had been brought in. Seventeen million Koreans had been immunized against cholera, and cases of that disease declined from sixteen thousand in 1946 to exactly twenty-four cases the following year. Some three hundred thousand spindles and ten thousand looms were producing. Over a thousand machine shops and eighty-six rubber factories had been reactivated. Korea was trading with Hong Kong and Japan, and building up its foreign-exchange balance to pay for future imports. Orphanages, leprosariums, and agricultural schools had been reopened.

Garbage piles that had stood window-high in the cities were beginning to disappear. One million more South

Korean children were in primary school in 1949 than in 1945; there were 34,757 teachers (as against 13,782), and 3,442 schools (as against 2,694). The higher schools showed proportional increases.

It would be idle to claim that South Korea was absolutely thriving before June 25, 1950. The basic work of land reform was still to be done; industrialization still had a long way to go; the legislature was too largely representative of the strongly conservative interests. Last January, Ambassador-at-Large Philip Jessup told the South Korean Assembly that "there are certain other things which are within your power to accomplish which you have not done." But neither can South Korea's record be described as all negative. There has been a lot of talk about the "dynamism" of the North Koreans as compared to the "apathy" of the South Koreans. The implication is that ECA officials in South Korea should have whipped up the same sort of psychopathic fanaticism that the Soviet officials did in North Korea. We work on the minds of people; we do not knock them over the head.

The ECA set up a showcase in a neighborhood where what it had to offer was most needed by the people and most exasperating to the Communist masterminds. The program of economic help to foreign nations does not necessarily coincide with the strategic plans of our military leaders. The military must base their calculations on the assumption that there may be war; the businessmen on the assumption that there may be something like peace, at least for a while. This is the risk that the businessmen of the ECA took when they started their Korean program. American business has learned how to move in the world on its own steam without counting on the protection of the American flag or the Marines. For the ECA is nothing but American business at its most unselfish, most efficient self.

The money and the energy that the army of occupation and the ECA spent in Korea produced a sample demonstration of what American economic assistance can achieve in the rehabilitation of an Asian country. The Communists became so worried about the record we had established that they had to move in and undo what we had done.

—RICHARD DONOVAN

What Lies Behind Nehru's Neutrality?

Perhaps for the first time since he became India's Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs, Pandit Nehru not long ago was undecided for two whole days. Before approving the Security Council resolution calling for military aid to South Korea, he awaited a report from the Indian member of the U.N. Commission on Korea.

The issue facing Nehru was not whether to endorse or condemn the resolution. That had already been settled by Indian support for the earlier U.N. resolution that named North Korea the aggressor and urged it to withdraw its forces to the 38th parallel. The crucial issue was how this support could be squared up with Nehru's basic policy of neutrality.

On the evening of June 29, Nehru announced his decision. While accepting the resolution on aid, the government of India stuck to a foreign policy based "on the promotion of world peace and friendly relations with all countries." But it was evident that on the Korean issue India had lined up with the United States and the other democratic nations. For once India had reduced its ambiguous foreign policy to an understandable, definite attitude, but it left many people both inside the country and abroad guessing. For to Indians it seemed clear that the Korean War was not a simple affair of aggression by one country against another, but a phase of U.S.-Soviet tension. How could a nation openly committed to aid one of the participants in the conflict maintain friendship with the other? Commentators trying to explain this contradiction fell back on Nehru's statement before the U.S. Congress last November: "Where freedom is menaced, or justice threatened, or where aggression takes place, we cannot be and shall not remain neutral."

Official Indian spokesmen elucidat-

ing Nehru's decision later said that it did not affect India's policy toward China or Indo-China. In spite of this clarification, Indians continued to feel that before sanctioning support to military operations against fellow Asians, the Indian Cabinet should have collected all the facts about the situation in Korea. An extreme section even insisted that Security Council intervention was uncalled for in a conflict which could have been treated simply as a step to achieve Korean unity.

Nehru, however, justified his decision as a morally correct stand against aggression. Stolidly the people accepted the declaration, but they still wanted to know what Nehru thought of deployment of U.S. naval forces along nearly the entire length of the U.S. defense perimeter in the Pacific. The highly influential *National Herald*, with which Nehru is associated but which follows an independent policy, said editorially: "If today the U.S.A. is intensely interested in the Pacific, tomorrow she may be intensely interested in the Indian Ocean. In allowing the U.S.A. to do what she pleases, the Security Council is serving the cause of aggression, not of peace."

Nehru wishes, of course, to see the Korean conflict localized. He wants, in other words, to prevent Russia or Red China from coming in on the side of Ho Chi Minh in Indo-China or the combined Anglo-American fleet from opening up its guns on the Chinese mainland and igniting a world war. From the Russian attitude so far, it seems fairly clear that Stalin is neither willing nor prepared to undertake a major conflict. If the Korean issue is not speedily settled, the tragedy of Greece may be repeated in Asia, for in the long run the superiority of U.S. armed might must prevail over the



North Korean forces despite any help they get from the Soviet Union. A U.S.-backed government of the extreme Right in Korea would prove a constant source of irritation to Asian countries, if not an actual threat to Asian security.

As the speediest and most effective way to settle the dispute, Nehru proposed the admission of Red China to the United Nations. With characteristic shrewdness, Stalin accepted his good faith. Red China's admission to the U.N., Nehru feels, would mean some loss of face to the U.S., but he contends that reasons of prestige should not be allowed to vitiate chances of maintaining international peace. In this attempt to bring the U.N. back to normal life, it is the U. S. government that Nehru has found intractable. India does not think that admission of Red China to the U.N. will be an encouragement to aggression, and is still canvassing support for China's membership.

Nehru's policy of neutrality is founded first on an idealistic conception of India's role in world affairs. He thinks that India, with its tradition of non-violence, will be able to exert its moral influence against any breach of world peace. In a world full of fiercely nationalistic states, the success of this approach has unfortunately proved limited.

In advocating neutrality, Nehru also

assumes that the material interests of a predominantly agricultural and undeveloped country like India are different from those of the great powers and the industrialized nations of the West. Lacking the capital resources and technical knowledge for manufacturing complicated production equipment, India must rely on industrially advanced nations to put through its development plans. By taking sides in the world conflict, it is said, India will jeopardize chances of rapid industrialization and forfeit potential friends.

Nehru vigorously repudiates the idea of any alliance smacking of subservience. "I do not think that anything could be more injurious to us . . . than for us to give up the policies that we have pursued, namely those of standing up for certain ideals in regard to the oppressed nations, and try to align ourselves with this great power or that and become its camp followers in the hope that some crumbs might fall from its table."

In India now it is impossible to divert national resources to unproductive purposes, such as gearing up the country's defenses to fight Communism, without incurring dangers to internal stability. Defense already takes up more than half of India's budget. Further expenditure would dislocate an economy now held together by various short-term expedients. Nehru also has no desire to accentuate social conflicts

that are already holding up both industrial and agricultural production.

Neither Nehru nor any other Indian leader considers Communism an unmitigated tyranny that the world must immediately get rid of. Nehru has said: "The various ideologies that confront the world today, the various isms which threaten conflict repeatedly may have a great deal to commend themselves but all of them have been derived from the background of Europe. The background of Europe is not completely the background of India or the world, and there is absolutely no reason why we should be asked to choose between this ideology or the other in toto." Nehru has often proclaimed an intrepid belief in the ultimate *ideals* of Communism—a free society without class or racial distinction—though he disapproves of the violently insurrectionary methods of the Communists. To him the Soviet system has as much right to exist as western democracy. Long ago, in days of intense anti-British nationalism, he used to consider it the pioneer of a new civilization, but now he is credited with the opinion that the Soviet Union is following a "nationalistic expansionist policy."

Nehru's own views on these questions are of tremendous importance, because they are the chief determinants of India's foreign policy. His ideas generally prevail in the Cabinet, and even



Mao Tse-tung

more so in Parliament. Discussions on foreign affairs in Parliament are usually lengthy monologues by Nehru. There is no "popular backing for foreign policy" in India, because eighty per cent of the people are illiterate.

India's neutrality has found expression in friendship and trade agreements with various countries irrespective of their prior international allegiances. India has made treaties of friendship with Nepal, Iran, and Afghanistan, and talks have been in progress on similar pacts with the United States and Burma. Trade agreements exist between India and Czechoslovakia, West Germany, and Switzerland for the exchange of machinery and raw materials, and between India and Iran for agricultural products.

Eager to cultivate universal friendship, India has developed extensive contacts with all the first-, second-, and even third-rate powers of the world. The multiplicity of Indian embassies, consulates, legations, and trade offices has evoked sharp criticism at home. A poor country like India, it is said, cannot afford so lavish a demonstration of good will.

Although Nehru's policy is neutral in the affairs of the great powers, it changes to frank encouragement of nationalist movements in the colonial countries of Asia and Africa. India, Nehru believes, has a greater understanding of colonial problems than other democratic nations, and has a historic obligation to assist colonial peoples. Nehru stood by Indonesia even when the United States and Britain were disposed to favor partial Dutch

authority as a safety measure. Since Indonesia became a sovereign state, President Soekarno has followed a neutrality policy similar to Nehru's but a divergence in their views has taken place over South Korea—a minor difference as far as mutual relations are concerned.

India is committed to vigorous support of Thakin Nu's régime in Burma, which is constantly threatened by rebellion. Nehru is anxious to support nationalism in Malaya and Indo-China, but the lines of nationalist development in those places have been badly blurred. Resistance to Communism in both countries could have some meaning for their inhabitants if it were combined with genuine offers of freedom. India's interest in Malaya is especially keen since there are more than five hundred thousand Indians in Malaya. Indian observers have testified that the guerrillas are not all Communists, and the so-called bandit movement is in fact a struggle to throw off British rule. The British in Malaya, as India sees it, are interested primarily in rubber and tin, not freedom.

During his recent visit to Malaya, Nehru spoke disapprovingly of terrorism. His statement was eagerly interpreted by British colonialists as support of British policy in Malaya, though it was merely the expression of Nehru's dislike of violence. Terrorism in Malaya is certainly two-sided, and Indians cannot believe that the expensive war Britain is waging is inspired by purely humanitarian motives.

Many Indians regard American sup-



Syngman Rhee

port in Indo-China to the French and Bao Dai with mixed fear and loathing: fear of U.S. intervention in other Asian countries, and loathing because of the support being extended to a thoroughly reactionary régime. More moderate in his views, Nehru himself has decided not to recognize either of the governments in Indo-China, because he has no desire either to encourage Bao Dai or to accelerate the spread of Communism through recognition of the Viet Minh government. In American support to Bao Dai, India finds the same blundering zeal to prop up anti-Communist forces with the aid of the most amenable colonial clique which caused the debacle of U. S. policy in China. Informed Indians have no doubt that this U.S. adventure will end as unsatisfactorily as that in China.

The most common reaction in the West to India's attitude is to ask what alternative to military assistance of local anti-Communist elements India can propose. This presupposes an aim which India is not prepared to accept as wholly desirable—the destruction of Communism. There is truly no "alternative" as such to the western stand that India can suggest, except perhaps the conversion of the funds now spent in generous gifts of planes and guns into productive capital equipment and agricultural machinery. That is the only course the United States or other western nations can sensibly adopt at this stage to retain Asian good will. Americans claim to be fostering nationalism in Asia, but it is a different branch of nationalism from that which Asians wish to see sponsored.

Mere encouragement of nationalism is in any case devoid of meaning in colonial areas unless it also provides an incentive for social change. Feudal landownership in Indo-China and the foreign monopoly of economic life in Malaya have arrested economic progress in both countries. A wider distribution of wealth among the people will be necessary before economic development can get under way. The United States, Britain, and France have made little or no effort to abolish unequal economic privileges. And unfortunately Indian support of nationalism in colonial countries has no more than emotional significance. In this respect Red China holds a strong ad-

vantage over India. Uninhibited by native vested interests, Mao Tse-tung can agitate for social change without being accused of "intervention."

The victory of Communism in China has not had serious repercussions in internal political life in India, except to induce a tactical change in the local Communist Party line. India's present leaders are determined not to allow the country's stability to be undermined. The threat to internal peace from recurrent religious riots has been laid low by the conclusion of the Delhi Pact between the Indian and Pakistan Prime Ministers, and even though the outstanding issue of dispute, Kashmir, remains unsolved, Nehru often "thinks aloud" in terms of an Indo-Pakistan Defense Union along the lines of the U.S.-Canadian alliance.

India's first line of defense lies across Pakistan in the countries of the Middle East. True to his neutrality, Nehru has refused to be drawn into the small-time quarrels and intrigues for power characteristic of Middle Eastern politics. The rise of any single big-power influence there is clearly against India's interest, and by moral support to Arab nationalism India has even sought to weaken the tenacious hold some western countries already have over the more conservative Middle Eastern states.

Nationalism, neutrality, and economic good sense were temporarily thrust into the background when Nehru agreed, at a conference of Prime Ministers in London in April, 1949, to keep India within the British Commonwealth. Other members decided to shed the epithet "British" to encourage him. The more important countries of the Commonwealth were even at that time lined up in the world conflict, and though membership imposes no specific obligations, there is a constant fear in India that the nation will be compelled to follow in their wake.

The "invisible ties" of the Commonwealth, it has been said, bind more fast than plainer bonds like treaties and mutual pacts. This has been proved true in one sphere at least: defense. In the past year India's representatives have attended a Commonwealth conference on standardization of arms and a meeting of Commanders-in-Chief of the Commonwealth armies. An integrated strategy and standardized army

equipment make one thing certain: which side India would be compelled to join if driven into a major conflict.

Will the Commonwealth association benefit India economically? It is inconceivable that the industrialized communities within the Commonwealth would invite their own impoverishment by voluntarily co-operating in the industrialization of an area that forms the market for the bulk of their manufactured goods. At the Sydney Conference of Commonwealth Foreign Ministers held in May this year India demanded priority for long-term measures of industrial development, but its views were opposed by the Australian and British Foreign Ministers. They maintained that financial aid that would bring higher standards of living only after a period of years was not enough. What they meant was: "We understand your needs and we are in sympathy with them. But you cannot expect us to do things which will eventually prove harmful to us. We cannot, for instance, initiate schemes which will deprive us of the markets that sustain our home industries. You should be thankful for small mercies and co-operate with us in whatever little we can collectively do for you. But we have got to draw the line somewhere." India finally had to agree to the eight-million-pound loan to be raised among Commonwealth governments for short-term aid and technical assistance, without much hope of direct benefit from it itself. The net advan-



Bao Dai



Ho Chi Minh

tage to India from Commonwealth membership seems to be the glamour of military and political association with nations of the West.

Nehru himself admits that a country's foreign policy is ultimately determined by internal economic needs. India needs large amounts of capital for industrialization. Reliance on foreign generosity will not meet these needs. Capital from the United States amounted to a paltry sum during 1949-1950 despite assurances of protection against discriminatory treatment and promise of fair returns.

India's capital will ultimately have to come out of the efforts and savings of Indians themselves—savings that can pay for imports of plant and heavy machinery, and can make further capital accumulation possible. And in consequence neutrality will also need to be revised to allow scope for closer alliances with countries that can spare capital equipment and technical personnel for the development of retarded areas without fear of upsetting their domestic economies. The economies of the Southeast Asian countries are not complementary; their economic interests are common. Pressure of economic circumstances will compel them to come together, and the ideal of Asian unity which Nehru finds out of his reach will then be realized under the impersonal force of necessity.

—P. VISWANATH

Puerto Ricans in New York



The twenty-five to thirty thousand Puerto Ricans now arriving in the United States each year, over ninety per cent of whom settle in Greater New York, face problems and opportunities the like of which they have never encountered in their island life.

In San Juan or Ponce, the leading cities of Puerto Rico, where too many people live on too little ground, the native strolls through the town plaza in the cool of the evening when breezes come over the blue Caribbean waters. He may listen to the radio in the *cantina*, or retire to his white-walled dwelling or ramshackle hut, outside of which hogs and goats eat the garbage he throws into the yard. He enjoys chatting with his friends and forgetting the filthy business of making a living. If he happens to be Negro, he suffers no discrimination, but is excluded from higher social circles, along with his neighbors of Spanish blood but little money.

The pace of life is slow and the climate is mild all the year round, with the temperature seldom far above or below seventy-five degrees. On the island the slogan is "*mañana*"; in New York it's "Do It Now." A favorite Puerto Rican joke when making an appointment with a friend is to ask, "Do you mean five o'clock Puerto Rican or American time?" Although there is very little native art, the emphasis in the island is on music, dancing, and poetry. Cultured, wealthier Puerto Ricans are proud of their Spanish heritage

and regard Cervantes, Lope de Vega, and Goya as fellow countrymen. Americanized Puerto Ricans, both on the island and in New York, have come to think more of Henry Ford and Ginger Rogers than of Ferdinand and Isabella.

Walking through "Spanish Harlem," which extends from 100th to 125th Streets between Third and Fifth Avenues, or the Puerto Rican East Bronx, which extends from East 138th to 170th Streets between Third Avenue and Southern Boulevard, or Manhattanville, which goes from 122nd to 135th Streets along Broadway, one gets the impression of Latin mixed with polyglot, and of the exotic grafted on the ruined. The buildings in which many Puerto Ricans are forced by poverty to live look like the nightmares of a malign god. The Fifth Avenue of Puerto Ricans in New York is Madison Avenue between 100th and 125th Streets. There are big groceries, one called "La Flor de Madison," shops where sharp clothes with padded shoulders are displayed in the windows, pool parlors that idlers hang around, stomach-ailment ads on drugstore windows, funeral parlors, and travel agencies that serve also as real-estate offices.



East of this main boulevard and Puerto Rican shopping thoroughfare the decayed houses extend toward the river and northward seemingly without relief. In the East Bronx, Westchester Avenue is the main thoroughfare. The subway becomes the elevated along Westchester Avenue; the streets east and west of the avenue are hilly and drab, occupied by Puerto Ricans and American Negroes. There are vacant lots with dusty, bare earth and large rocks. One expects to find goats munching away here, but there isn't anything for them to munch.

On his native island, the Puerto Rican seldom has a ride of more than fifteen minutes in a bus to and from work, and more often he can walk. After returning home by subway in New York, he barricades himself within the four distempered walls of a ruined flat out of which other underprivileged inhabitants have moved as fast as they could afford to, and which he usually shares with several other Puerto Rican families. Social workers find that many Puerto Ricans live a timid, restricted life in New York. The big city overwhelms them, and their lack of English makes them fearful of straying from beaten paths and closes many educational and social services to them. Accustomed to being in the open on their island, they find themselves miserable in their cramped New York railroad flats and spend much of their time in the streets, standing silently in doorways or on street corners. Sometimes they go to the numerous store-cafes for strong black coffee, beer, or rum and to talk with companions in misery. Children swarm around the streets, ever watchful of the gangs of Italian, Negro, Irish, and Jewish children who pick fights with them.

In Puerto Rico, rooms without running water or even a toilet in the hall rent for as little as four dollars a month. In New York, Puerto Ricans pay at



least thirty-eight dollars a month for dark rooms, which might have hot water, but are usually badly in need of plumbers and painters. Broken windows are common; cockroaches are constant companions, though visitors testify that Puerto Ricans on the whole keep their apartments spotlessly clean. The garbage men turn up last in the neighborhoods where Puerto Ricans live, and sometimes these rotting houses don't even have mailboxes.

In New York Puerto Ricans suffer all the indignities of poor foreigners. They are only technically Americans. For the most part, they do the behind-the-scenes work. They are bus boys who set the tables for the waiters who get the tips. They wash the dishes, make the beds, scrub the floors, launder, sew and cut clothing, make paper boxes, make cookies and candy, clean up apartment and office buildings, at night, and tend the swimming pools in the basements of hotels. Like all other immigrants, the Puerto Ricans try to get out of these menial jobs as soon as possible. They start small businesses on meager savings and often go bankrupt.

In order to improve their lot the Puerto Ricans of New York are joining labor unions, and organized labor is more and more conscious every year of the importance of organizing them so that they won't become a huge pool of cheap labor available to employers resisting union regulations. There are many Puerto Ricans in the Hotel and Restaurant Workers' Union, and there are Puerto Rican officials in some

locals of the garment and maritime workers' unions. Some unions have established classes in English for Puerto Ricans, and union news is printed in Spanish.

Settlement houses and churches have taken an active part in adult-education classes for Puerto Ricans in New York so that they may quickly overcome their most serious handicap, lack of the language. The Board of Education has organized night classes in English for them, and at Hudson Guild, Grand Street Settlement, Bronx House, Union Settlement, and Madison House, courses in Basic English have proved highly successful.

Other residents of the slum areas where they live call the Puerto Ricans "spicks," a contemptuous term which H. L. Mencken, world authority on the American language, says is a variant of "spiggoty," which originated in Panama and was rapidly used for any Latin-American. The word "spick" started as U. S. Navy slang, and, according to Mencken, "is a derisive daughter of 'No *spik* Inglés.'"

Soon after the American occupation of Puerto Rico in 1898, English became the language in which all subjects were taught in the schools, and Spanish became a "foreign" language, although the boys and girls all spoke and read it at home. So little did the new American guardians know about their wards that Puerto Rican teachers who came to the mainland for advanced study were sent to Carlisle and Haskell Institutes by bureaucrats under the impression that they must be

Indians since they came from the West Indies. Today New York University sends teachers to Puerto Rico in summer to learn Puerto Rican ways so that they can do a better job with their numerous Puerto Rican pupils in New York's public schools, and Teachers College of Columbia has race-study courses that cover the Puerto Ricans.

Politicians rather than educators had the idea of teaching all courses in Puerto Rico's schools in English, and it worked out badly. A favorite Puerto Rican saying is: "We are illiterate in two languages." Puerto Ricans have a colonial people's resentment at being forced to do things by domineering rulers who fancy themselves superior to the natives. Not long ago, a social worker in Harlem watching some Puerto Rican children playing among themselves and chattering in Spanish in a back-yard playground suggested that they speak English because then they would more easily be able to play with other children. One small boy drew himself up and asked: "Do we have to speak English?" "No," the social worker answered. "We don't have to speak English?" the Puerto Rican boy asked again to make sure. "No." "Then we will speak English," he said.

Spanish is once more the language of the schools in Puerto Rico, and "continentals" have noticed that Puerto Ricans who formerly refused to speak English when it was compulsory in the schools now speak it willingly and even like to practice it on visitors. According to the 1940 census, 31.5 per cent of all Puerto Ricans were un-

able to read and write. More and more of the government revenues are being spent each year on education, and the younger generation are attending school. Extreme poverty, however, forces about half of them to leave before they reach the sixth grade.

Although Puerto Ricans are Catholic by tradition, Protestant sects have made inroads on the island and in the Puerto Rican colonies in New York. There are sixty-two Protestant Spanish-speaking churches in New York, and Puerto Ricans as well as other Spanish-Americans go to them. Holy Week on the island is celebrated with solemn Latin ritual. The new migrant to New York is often shocked when he is expected to work on Good Friday. Religion in the big city seems to him to be highly commercialized, and services more like a convention than the answer to a deep spiritual need. Throughout the island of Puerto Rico groups of Spiritualists have set up meeting places. They hold séances, offer Spiritualist remedies for illness, and have medicine men who sell charms and herbs in the villages. These are also sold in the dark arcade around the big public market beneath the railroad tracks on Park Avenue between 110th and 115th Streets. In a walk through the Puerto Rican section of East Harlem I noticed many stores called "Botanical Gardens" where herbs and incense were sold along with religious statuettes, dream books, and books on the policy game, as well as a book called *Inglés en 20 Lecciones*.

Most of the Puerto Ricans who come to New York have had jobs at home but come here in order to get higher wages. Usually, they can earn two and a half times as much as they do in Puerto Rico, and despite the high cost of living manage to save up money in order to send for their families or to better their position. New York's Puerto Ricans are the more literate of the islanders, and they are apt to be young and vigorous, though small in stature. Some Puerto Ricans invest in dumbbells and other gymnastic material in order to build their physique as compensation for their stature, and quite a few Puerto Rican boxers are developing in the sporting world. Puerto Rican doctors, lawyers, teachers, and other professional people can do all right on the island or in Latin-American coun-

tries, but some of these also come to New York for study or to practice.

The industrial-development program organized by the Administration of Governor Luis Muñoz Marín in Puerto Rico has created jobs there. In order to induce capital to invest in island industries, it has offered new industries tax exemption for twelve years beginning July 1, 1947. Some new plants have been established for the production of cement, glass containers,



clay products, shoes, gloves, leather goods, candies, bamboo and hardwood furniture, jewelry, pharmaceuticals, refrigerators, radios, and textiles.

But no matter how successful the Puerto Rican industrial-development program becomes, the lure of New York for Puerto Ricans will remain great. The island is much too small to accommodate its dense population, which has one of the highest birth rates in the world. Raw materials have to be imported at costs that make it difficult for many industries to compete with other American and foreign sources of the same products. The Puerto Rican labor force increases at an alarming rate every year, and there is always a large amount of unemployment and part-time employment. In normal times unemployment on the island amounts to ten per cent of the entire labor force, and in depression times the figure rises to one-quarter.

The Puerto Rican Government Department of Labor has an office at Broadway and 62nd Street in New York. Here social workers and others, under the direction of Manuel Cabranes, supervise the planned seasonal migration of farm workers which the government of Puerto Rico has organ-

ized. In 1949 five thousand workers came to the United States by airplane and were distributed to sugar-beet farms in Michigan and farms in New York State, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Washington, and Minnesota. A branch office in Chicago promotes employment in the West. It is estimated that about ten thousand Puerto Ricans have been working here, mainly on farms, during the summer and fall of 1950.

This seasonal migration fits in nicely with the sugar economy of Puerto Rico. Sugar workers are employed mainly from January to June each year, when sugar is grown, harvested, and ground. They average between four and five hundred dollars a year, and from June to January many of their families go hungry. Under the planned migration, some of these are brought in in an orderly fashion by the Puerto Rican government to work on farms, with their plane fares advanced by their employers. Their rights are protected by contracts, and most of them go back again when the sugar season starts. Being citizens, they do not have to go back, and a few remain. In addition to farm workers, the planned-migration efforts succeeded in placing Puerto Ricans in steel mills when labor was scarce. That demand has since fallen off, but with rearmament and new war orders, a revival of opportunity for Puerto Ricans is expected. As a result of planned migration, small colonies of Puerto Ricans have grown up in Philadelphia, Camden, Allentown, Pittsburgh, Bridgeport, Chicago, Miami, Los Angeles, and San Francisco. They write home, and more and more Puerto Ricans are now getting the idea that New York is not the only place in the United States to live.

The Administration of Governor Muñoz, the first Puerto Rican to be elected by popular vote of the islanders instead of being appointed by the President, is deeply conscious of the importance of curbing the growth of population on the island, of improving education, and developing industry and agriculture there with the aid of mainland capital and advice. There is a movement for complete independence in Puerto Rico, but it is more abstract and fervent than powerful.

In his inaugural address on January 2, 1949, Governor Muñoz put the situation succinctly: "The United States

tomorrow can, without loss, declare Puerto Rico a nation apart; and the most notable political novelty would be a change in my title and that of my successors. But there could be economic changes that would be highly damaging in their effect of restricting the integral liberty, in their work, in their commerce, in the betterment of their homes, in security, in the creative dynamism of millions of human beings who could hardly be benefited by a change in my title."

When Rexford G. Tugwell took office as Governor of Puerto Rico in 1941, he put forth the hope and the challenge that harnessing water, wind, and sun for power purposes and doubling or quadrupling the productivity of arable land by scientific means would take care of Puerto Rico's large population. He also suggested emigration to countries other than the United States. Bad as is the lot of the Puerto Ricans, it is superior to that of most of the natives of South American countries, where their knowledge of Spanish and the vocational education many have received under an enlightened government program would be advantageous.

Although economic development on the island and emigration to South America are important, some think the basic solution for the problem of the Puerto Ricans is birth control. There is a growing demand in Puerto Rico for birth-control information, and in recent years many Puerto Ricans have been getting themselves sterilized in order to avoid the terrible economic burden of a child a year. The death rate has declined sharply as the birth rate has increased. When Spanish medievalism was supplanted by American sanitation, smallpox and yellow fever were quickly eliminated. The entire population of Puerto Rico was vaccinated during the first year of American occupation.

When Puerto Ricans become famous or successful, they are readily accepted in the United States. José Ferrer, the actor and director, has no trouble, nor has Juano Hernández, New York and Hollywood star, who was born in Puerto Rico of African heritage. Among other well-known Puerto Ricans are Graciela Rivera, coloratura soprano, Jesús María Sanromá, the pianist, Noro Morales, composer and orchestra

leader, and Luis Juero Chiesa, talented artist and illustrator of children's books.

In September, 1949, Mayor William O'Dwyer appointed an Advisory Committee on Puerto Ricans, with Welfare Commissioner Raymond M. Hilliard as chairman. Prominent Puerto Ricans are members of its subcommittees and the main committee. They are working earnestly to better economic conditions and the housing situation and to improve job, educational, and health conditions for the poorer Puerto Ricans. In a report to the Mayor, Commissioner Hilliard wrote: "The overwhelming majority of the Puerto Ricans are self-supporting, hard-working citizens of New York City, contributing to the essential industries and well-being of the City. Contrary to frequent statements and often expressed opinions, only a small minority of the Puerto Ricans in New York City are receiving public assistance, and there are easily understandable reasons for their need of help."

New York is doing much to help its numerous Puerto Ricans. Housing developments in Harlem, The Bronx, and Brooklyn are being built and others have been planned. The Department of Welfare now has Puerto Rican investigators who can speak to the needy in Spanish. Puerto Rican women volunteers are acting as interpreters in some hospitals. Church and settlement work helps the adults learn English and get vocational education and helps the children get play facilities and instruction. Lurid misrepresentations against Puerto Ricans are being answered by a public-relations committee.

But New York can never solve the Puerto Rican problem alone. The government of Puerto Rico is already doing its best to siphon off migrants to other parts of the United States where job opportunities and living quarters are better. A resettlement program with the aid of the Federal government and the state and municipal governments is essential to get the Puerto Ricans out of New York's slums. Areas for their reception must be prepared with housing and trained personnel to guide them in getting jobs and to see that they get fair treatment.

The Puerto Ricans themselves are frightened in New York, and many New Yorkers are resentful and fearful of their increasing numbers. This is a situation that could lead to violence, crime, and misery, especially in the event of another depression. Puerto Ricans don't enjoy overcrowding or crime any more than other people, and they like to feel that there is the same hope for their children as there was for those of the Irish, the Italians, and the Jews who came in the hundreds of thousands. Some Puerto Ricans who have caught on to the ways of the city feel that the sooner they can acquire political influence, the faster they can improve their lot. One of them remarked recently: "The Irish were kicked around until they got to be district leaders and mayors; the Italians were kicked around until they got a mayor and some district leaders. Maybe some day New York will have a mayor whose great-grandparents came from Puerto Rico."

—M. R. WERNER

(This is the second of two articles.)



The Hiss Case

And the American Intellectual

The effort to assess the blame for the crisis in which this country finds itself today has become almost a national obsession. It is not surprising that one of the most conspicuous figures in this assessment should be Alger Hiss. If one had deliberately sought out the man and the symbol, the history and the legend, it would have been difficult to find a more perfect representative either for innocent victim or guilty conspirator, the choice depending on one's perspective.

Virtually all of the mass of material written about Hiss has been in terms of his guilt or his innocence. A few passionately partisan followers have remained loyal through every stage and still are convinced that a great injustice has been done. In the mass press and on the radio Hiss has been represented as the archetype of the traitor: the disloyal intellectual who gave his country's secrets to the enemy. There is good reason to believe that with his conviction in the second trial this is now the generally accepted view.

Little or no attention has been paid to what seems to me to be the really vital question. That is how this could have happened, why it came about. Even to those who still persist in believing Hiss innocent (and I am not one of these), this must be of the first importance; since it must be to them a frightening phenomenon that an upright, innocent, idealistic man should have been led to disgrace and almost certain imprisonment, with the great majority of his fellow citizens willing and even eager to believe in his guilt.

The Hiss case, with its far-reaching implications, seems to me to go back to origins that have scarcely been explored at all. In a far more subtle way than the company of smearers and screamers could conceivably comprehend, it is related to the tragedy of

American foreign policy in the post-war years and to the unreality of an approach to foreign policy which could lead to the creation of a disastrous inverse ratio by which America's military strength was being reduced while commitments everywhere were constantly increased.

The tragedy of Alger Hiss is the tragedy of the American intellectual *in extremis*. It is no accident that this should have been widely sensed and that the current and ominous wave of anti-intellectualism should be related to the unfolding of the Hiss tragedy.

The position of the intellectual in America has long been an anomalous one. This has been true at least since

the middle of the nineteenth century. It is a theme that recurs again and again in American literature from William Dean Howells to Booth Tarkington. The sensitive individual withdraws from the crassness and the crudity of American life. Henry James and Mary Cassatt were merely the precursors of a whole stream of expatriates, which in the 1920's became a flood bent on escaping from Coolidge Prosperity, with its praise for pecuniary "success" and its angry condemnation of "failure."

One may say, of course, that this was not solely an American phenomenon. In the burgeoning hideousness of late Victorian England the Pre-Raphaelites sought escape in aestheticism and finally in the cult of the precious.



Death of a dream: Hemingway after Spain

But in England the rebellious intellectual was not so completely divorced from the main currents of British life. The Pre-Raphaelites were not unrelated to the Fabian Society. In the Fabian Society intellectuals such as Bernard Shaw found a perfect medium of political expression directly related to the course of events. Regardless of what one may think of the British Labour Party, the intellectuals in the Fabian Society were the progenitors and inspirers of one of the great political movements of the twentieth century.

Nothing like the Fabian Society could have come into being in America, because the American intellectual has been perennially divorced from the political life of his time. Some would put the blame for this divorce on the intellectual himself—on his timid retreat from the realities of the development of the American continent with its vast ramifications of industry and transport. Others, including the intellectuals themselves, insist that the intellectual was driven out by the materialism enforced by an industrial society.

Emigrating to the Paris of James Joyce, to the Spain of Ernest Hemingway, the American intellectual could disdain the commercial civilization he had left behind. He could become absorbed in symbolism, or in Marxism, or in just plain escapism. But with this went almost inevitably a sense of frustration and resentment. He had left home of his own choice, yet back of this choice was the fact that he had been disowned—in a sense, rejected. For all the Greenwich Villages and the little magazines, there had been no place for the intellectual among his own swarming, pragmatic, ceaselessly active people. He was not merely an émigré, he was also an outcast.

One of the most radical changes introduced by President Roosevelt after 1932 was the bringing of intellectuals to Washington. If one considers causes and results rather than surface repercussions, it may well have been the most important New Deal innovation. First came the professors, such as Raymond Moley and Rexford Tugwell. But they were only the vanguard. With the expansion of the New Deal came poets, artists, critics, and philosophers. It was an exciting and heady period, in which anything seemed possible. New and stirring ideas, both large and small,



were taken out of mothballs and tested. The "Greenbelt" concept of town planning was developed and even given an experimental and expensive trial run. The planner in charge, Professor Tugwell, had rhapsodized in Whitmanesque verse:

"I shall roll up my sleeves
And make over America."

But even in the midst of this heady adventure, the intellectual was not entirely sure of his role. He had no direct relationship with the rest of the country outside of Washington. The voter was to him a strange and unknown entity. Sometimes he went "into the field"—that was the expression—to discover such mysterious reaches as Fargo, North Dakota, or Houston, Texas. He could never forget that he owed his existence to the political genius of Franklin Roosevelt. Roosevelt was a sort of middleman who could speak the language of the intellectuals and still make himself understood in Fargo and Houston.

In this there was in no small degree the implication of a conspiracy: It must be done quickly; the reforms introduced, the new ideas pushed, the progress initiated, with the threat always that this fortunate interlude would be of brief duration. As I watched the New Deal unfold, this seemed to me one of its principal weaknesses; that too often the experiments being undertaken had little or no popular support in the country or in Congress. This, it must be remembered, was before the rise of a politically conscious trade-union movement in the industries of mass produc-

tion. As they developed, these unions gave their support to certain of the more solid measures of the New Deal, such as social-security legislation.

Nowhere was the conspiratorial aspect of the New Deal more evident than in the relationship between some of the New Deal agencies and Congress. Congress was a kind of ogre waiting to pounce on the fine plans that were being worked out and put into effect by men and women who had hitherto been excluded from the precincts of government, or even, for that matter, from the most ordinary practical endeavors. I do not mean to imply that there was anything sinister in this attitude. It was for the most part enormously well-meaning. Here were thinkers, idea men, scholars, and specialists who believed that they knew how to cure an America suffering from a terrible economic depression. There was scarcely time to explain and persuade by the lengthy process of democracy and education.

Moreover, in the great media of mass communications there was a definite and active hostility toward what these newcomers were undertaking. It is sometimes forgotten how soon attacks were directed at the intellectuals brought into government by the New Deal under Roosevelt. An outraged school executive from Indiana announced to the sensational press that he had discovered at a dinner party in Georgetown a plot to overthrow the American democracy. The "longhairs" in the Roosevelt Administration were constantly under fire.

It was in this atmosphere that Alger Hiss began his career in government. His first assignment was in the Agricultural Adjustment Administration. The story has often been told of how Hiss, together with Lee Pressman and two or three other associates, was working to "put over" on the Secretary of Agriculture, Henry A. Wallace, a system of farm payments that would benefit the small farmer rather than the large farmer. They were circumvented by others in the Department of Agriculture who took a more conservative view. In the showdown, Wallace sided with the conservatives, and the radicals were dismissed.

This was in many respects a typical internecine quarrel of the early New Deal era. The noble conspirators intrigued against the heavy hand of the

past; and they could feel a warm glow of self-righteousness as well as the excitement of intrigue for the sake of intrigue. It is significant that Pressman was allied with Hiss at this time. With his indomitable energy and his intense convictions, Pressman was to play a major part in two of the most important events related to the later development of the New Deal. One was the formation of the cio. The other was the attempt to compel American intervention in the Spanish Civil War on the side of the Loyalists.

After the purge in the Agricultural Adjustment Administration, Hiss acted as legal adviser to Senator Gerald Nye's special Senate committee investigating the munitions industry. A curious group had attached themselves to Nye, who was always eager for any publicity that was to be garnered. Among them were convinced pacifists of a passionate sincerity. There were others who for their own purposes assiduously spread the "merchants-of-death" concept of the munitions industry. One of Hiss's associates, interestingly enough, was John T. Flynn, later the foremost professional Roosevelt smearer, who was "economic adviser" to the committee. There can be no doubt that one result of the committee's activities was to make it more difficult to persuade Americans to accept rearmament as the threat of Nazism to world peace and security became more evident.

But for Hiss, service with the Senate committee was merely an interlude. It was during this interlude that he met Whittaker Chambers. Having started out to shock and outrage the conventional world around him, Chambers, the brilliant, bitterly disillusioned intellectual, had become part of the conspiratorial apparatus of Communism.

After a brief tour of duty in the Department of Justice, Hiss became, as he sets out in such careful detail in *Who's Who in America*, "Assistant to the Assistant Secretary of State." This was in 1936. That year marked the beginning of a crisis far deeper than most Americans understood. In July of 1936 the Spanish Revolution broke out. The menace of Fascism had become real. As German planes and Italian tanks were demonstrating on the Iberian Peninsula, Fascism was capable of overrunning all Europe. Hitler had declared specifically in *Mein Kampf* that Ger-

many must seek *Lebensraum* in eastern Europe, where Russia was a rotten apple ready to fall.

Thus, at the beginning of a critical phase in world history, Hiss was inside the State Department. It is not hard to see how the conspiratorial zeal of the New Dealer was transferred to this new sphere. If it was important for the idealist, the maker of a brave new world, to conspire to introduce radical new town planning, a better system of agriculture, how much more important to conspire to save the world, and above all the Soviet Union, from destruction by Fascism. This was the story that has been told in considerable and harrowing detail by another young intellectual in the State Department, Henry Julian Wadleigh, in confessions written after he had been subpoenaed to testify before the grand jury that indicted Hiss.

This willingness to conspire, even to the extent of passing out secret documents to known agents of the Communist Party, has been one of the most baffling aspects of the tragic phenomenon of betrayal. But taken in context, it seems to me understandable. Intellectuals everywhere were confused, often willfully confused, by a wholly



idealized picture of Soviet Russia—an extraordinary myth in which more often than not the troubled intellectual deliberately sought escape. To save the Soviet Union was to save the bulwark of western freedom. Where else was there any power capable of resisting Fascism, and ready to resist it? Schooled and ruthless agents of Communism were, of course, eager to help in the myth-making process, and always at

hand to prompt, encourage, and finally, perhaps, to ensnare the dupes.

To the well-intentioned idealist in the State Department who had served his novitiate in the New Deal, there was an added reason to feel that it was necessary to conspire in order that right might triumph and the wicked be put down. This lies in one of the inherent and yet little-recognized obstacles to the conduct of foreign policy in a democracy such as ours, in which every man's opinion is considered to be as good as the next man's. The conduct of foreign policy implies status and the recognition of status. The ambassador was the personal agent of the monarch, with perquisites and privileges denied to the ordinary citizen. Something of this has traditionally and historically adhered to the Foreign Minister and his representatives and collaborators.

But it is not a part of our tradition. In fact, it goes directly contrary to the egalitarian principle that is at the root of American character. We speak sneeringly of "the striped-pants boys," "the cookie-pushers." Their mystery, the protocol of their comings and goings, are cause not merely for scorn but for suspicion: There is more to this than meets the eye, and we will have none of it. One has only to watch a Secretary of State or an Assistant Secretary squirming before a Congressional committee to understand how this psychology works.

Neither Congress nor public opinion was prepared to understand the gravity of the threat that grew more and more acute after 1936. The intellectual saw Roosevelt try to take a political sounding in his speech advocating a "quarantine" of the aggressor; and he saw the rude and angry way in which Congressional and public opinion descended upon the President. So it was necessary to take things into one's own hands—to take steps that contravened the rules and regulations. What could rules and regulations mean in the face of such peril to all that was of deep and inherent value? It must be added, of course, that in this attitude was a considerable admixture of intellectual arrogance. It may be that arrogance is the other side of the coin of frustration.

This was the course, or so it seems to me, by which certain men of intellect and attainment were led to betray the


secrets of their country. How anyone, except a few ex-Communists who have found other directions in which to exercise their neurotic drive for power, can find reason to gloat over it is more than I have been able to understand. Perhaps the only explanation is in a smug exultation over the downfall of the intellectual. It has from the beginning seemed to me a tragedy of such gravity and moment as could scarcely be exaggerated.

The full import of this tragedy may be greater than has even now been realized. For it is against the background of the Hiss case that the evil of McCarthyism has been worked. From conspiracy to Communism to homosexuality, the cloud of suspicion has broadened and darkened. The conduct of foreign policy has been made far more difficult and uncertain. Policy, as evolved by the intellectual, the specialist, the expert, has seemed to have less and less relation to the brutal realities. And this may be because the intellectual has to an increasing degree sensed his isolation.

The policy of containing Communism everywhere is in large part the brain child of George Kennan. Kennan has many of the virtues and some of the defects of the intellectual, including a brilliant mind and a built-in recoil from the harsher aspects of politics. He also has a high integrity of purpose, an almost dedicated sense of duty.

The policy of containing Communism has a compelling logic. But, as we are now beginning painfully to perceive, it is hardly in accord with the realities of the world in which we live. The political facts of life were immediate demobilization after the Second World War, economy in armaments, and a rush to the "normalcy" of overflowing prosperity. The political commitments made in every corner of the globe are completely in accord with the logic of the policy of containment. Unfortunately, however, the inverse ratio was at work while that policy was being evolved. The more commitments that were made, the less strength we had in being. And the evolution of the policy of containment became an intellectual exercise.

This unhappy ratio seems to me to be strikingly symbolized by the principal participants. On the one hand were Kennan and Secretary of State



The age of fable: Hiss and Chambers

Dean Acheson. They stand as Ariel, bent on the precise logic of a good world where the monstrous evil of Communism is contained and ultimately banished. On the other side is Caliban, in the person of Secretary of Defense Louis Johnson, who carried the popular and opportunist appeal of economy, and who, meanwhile, laughed with Congress at the plight of the striped-pants boys. This is, of course, an oversimplification. But I do not believe that it exaggerates in any serious degree the relationship between the unreality of our foreign policy—unreality in terms of physical means and political methods—and the unhappy position of the intellectual, the specialist, the expert.

There will be those who will be annoyed by what I am trying to say here. Some will deny the relationship I have suggested. Others will say that, even though it may be true, one should not call attention to these things. But in my opinion it is long past time that we recognize the realities of our world.

Seeking to understand certain obscure relationships, we shall also perceive that it is not just one group of intellectuals, a handful of experts in the State Department who happen to have had extraordinary responsibility thrust upon them at a time of grave

crisis, who are now threatened by an anti-intellectualism more and more openly displayed. We shall perceive that it is the intellectual values, yes, the humanitarian values at the base of western civilization that are, in fact, endangered. We shall then be clearly aware of our duty to uphold and revitalize these values, even though this may mean the kind of struggle from which so many intellectuals have shrunk in the past. This will be no good-natured conspiracy to reshape the outward forms of society under the aegis of a political magician. It will be something far more serious than that casual adventure. The intellectual, to survive, must acquire new courage, new resolution, and a new sense of reality.

Toward the end of the domestic phase of the New Deal, as the oncoming of the Second World War obscured everything else, Mrs. Eleanor Roosevelt made a searching observation about the period that was ending. As I recall it in paraphrase, she said, "All that we have gained is time to think." One cannot be too confident about how well the intervening decade has been employed. But one can be sure that the luxury of *not* thinking is now a peril that invites disaster.

—MARQUIS CHILDS

Cincinnati's Phantom Reds

The Cincinnati *Enquirer* has solved a journalistic problem that has been troubling certain newspapers for years: how to publish a potentially libelous story without subjecting the editors to an extended period in a gloomy, ill-ventilated courtroom.

Like many important discoveries, the *Enquirer's* formula has Doric simplicity. Only three steps are necessary. First, select an exciting subject for an exposé, and fill the early, or "teaser," articles with enticing but libel-proof hints as to the identities of the people involved. Second, when the point in the story is reached where names must be given, send the reporter and his informants to recite them before a Congressional committee in open session. Third, print the names, secure in the knowledge that neither the paper nor the witnesses can be sued.

The *Enquirer* set out to unmask the Communists in Cincinnati, and six long, ominous-sounding articles were devoted to Red machinations in Senator Robert Taft's home city. A strong climax obviously required identification of the party members. But the first time the paper turned to the House Un-American Activities Committee to provide the libel-free denouement, the committee suddenly rejected the role assigned to it, and the *Enquirer* found itself in the embarrassing position of a Petruccio faced with a Kate who refused the final kiss. Eventually, however, a new last act—to date somewhat less dramatic than the *Enquirer's* original script called for—was agreed upon, and the Congressional group acted as the paper's shield against libel.

Since part of the press has periodically taken Congressmen to task for their reckless use of the immunity law, this first effort of a newspaper to share the same protection advances some inter-

esting ethical questions within the profession.

Certainly, the *Enquirer* was not niggardly in the space it allotted to its exposé. On the Sunday morning that the series began, over a third of the front page was given to the story. The article appeared under the by-line of James Ratliff, a staff writer who had spent five and a half years in the Army Counter Intelligence Corps during and after the war. COMMUNISTS MARK 12 CITY PLANTS FOR SABOTAGE! 178 Reds in Cincinnati, Including Professor, Three Doctors, 16 From Labor was the engaging headline. There were only three names in the text. Even the identification of the plants "... marked for sabotage in the event of war..." was omitted. There was, however, no lack of clues. "Among the listed [Communist Party] members are the head of a sign company, a former G.I. bill art student, two salesmen (one of food products), three doctors, two house painters, the head of an auto parts firm, a downtown tailor, a professional photographer, a disk jockey, a pool-room manager, a baker, a University of Cincinnati professor, the owner of a furniture business, two social workers, eight labor organizers, eight union officials (some heading locals), the head of a downtown painting firm, a newspaperman, an advertising man."

In a city the size of Cincinnati, where there is comparatively widespread acquaintanceship within the middle class, this list provided fascinating breakfast-table speculation. Almost everyone knew—or thought he knew—at least a handful of the names Mr. Ratliff had in mind. In some circles, however, there was considerable argument about the figure of 178 card-carrying members. The *Enquirer* itself was partially responsible for this confusion.

According to Mr. Ratliff's first

article, the Communists had lost eleven members in 1949 but had recruited twelve new members in the early months of this year. Brady Black, another *Enquirer* reporter, had written a story under the headline COMMIES COUNTED which said: "The figure—that is for dues-paying, card-carrying Communists [in Cincinnati]—is around 100. This comes from an agency which keeps close watch on Communist activities." Since there is no city, county, or state-police detail assigned specifically to subversive activities, it seems likely that the "agency" Mr. Black referred to is the Cincinnati FBI office.

The difference of seventy-eight names between Mr. Ratliff's and Mr. Black's lists suggests three possibilities: The Communist Party had practically doubled its membership, or the "agency's" informants are far less diligent than the *Enquirer's*, or Mr. Ratliff's registry may contain a number of names which do not belong here. It was this last contingency that troubled many



readers when the *Enquirer's* formula for publishing identifications finally came to light.

During the week that followed the first article (all pieces ran front page in the Sunday editions), the letters-to-the-editor column was given over entirely to comments about Communism in Cincinnati. There was also general insistence that the Comrades be named.

Part of the demand for identification came from groups and organizations which felt they were made suspect by Mr. Ratliff's broad statements. Leaders of labor unions were especially annoyed, because, they said, the article threw doubt upon the effectiveness of the Red purge that most of them had conducted within their own locals. Some employers asked for names so that potential saboteurs could be fired. A letter from the Parent-Teacher Association of Annunciation School urged a boycott of the University of Cincinnati's drive for funds until the president and board of directors carried out a culling operation. There was also a fair sprinkling of correspondents asking for names in the somewhat chilling tones of a lynch mob.

The second article in the series provided less titillation than the first. The headline was: **COMMIES CONTROL TWO BIG CINCINNATI UNIONS; Chapters in Three Others—How Reds Work Inside Labor.** Again the organizations were not identified, and the body of the story concentrated on telling how Communists use party discipline to take over a union.

Mr. Ratliff's third article probably

caused more pain among Democrats—another minority party in Cincinnati—than it did among the Marxist faithful.

"Although by now it is a well established fact that the Progressive party is the false face worn in politics by the Communist party," the piece began, "the frantic burrowing of the comrades into other parties never ceases, and they have scored particularly in penetrating the Democratic party here."

"Three members of the Communist party have shown up as Democrats for primary elections for the Ohio Legislature since the end of World War II. Two of them have been nominated and thus everyone in Hamilton County who voted the straight Democratic ticket in the November balloting when these 'Democrats' ran, voted for actual members of the Communist Party."

Since there have been two state primary and general elections in Ohio since 1945, the *Enquirer* avoided any pinpointing that might have caused legal complications.

As a regular reader of the strongly pro-Republican *Enquirer*, I couldn't avoid the suspicion that the paper was following the G.O.P. economy line and attempting to achieve some secondary results for the price of a single exposé. At the end of this particular article, for example, Mr. Ratliff wrote: "The comrades, who have been insisting that FEPC legislation—the Fair Employment Practices law—is a national must, are now contending that a similar ordinance shortly will be introduced for passage in City Council."

This concept of FEPC legislation as a Red project backs up the *Enquirer's* consistent opposition to the measure both nationally and in the state, but fails to suggest that the law also has the support of both major political parties in their national and Ohio platforms as well as the individual endorsements of such men as Thomas E. Dewey, President Truman, Charles Luckman, and Paul Hoffman.

In the next to last article, the *Enquirer* finally got around to naming the twelve plants to be sabotaged by the Communists in the event of war with Russia. Since Cincinnati's largest industry is the manufacture of machine tools, it was no surprise to find five companies in that business on the list. What puzzled me was the selection. Why are only a few of the many important ma-

chine-tool manufacturers in the city marked for disruption while the others will presumably be free to carry on their work without interference? It is also logical that an enemy would want to wreck the Crosley Corporation, which makes radios and other products, but it seems curious that the plotters have no interest in Procter and Gamble, which, in addition to soap, by routine steps in its chemical processes turns out vast quantities of the strategic material glycerine.

Until the week between the fifth and sixth articles, the other two Cincinnati papers, the *Times-Star* (owned by the Taft family) and the *Post* (Scripps-Howard) ignored the *Enquirer's* series almost completely. Beginning on Wednesday, however, they broke sharply with the Chesterfieldian manners which nowadays mark the relationship between competing papers. On that day, the *Post* scooped the *Enquirer* on its own story: **PROBERS SAY REPORTER HAD HEARSAY DATA; Other Witness Believed Mental Case at One Time** was the *Post's* headline. The story began: "The House un-American Activities Committee refused Wednesday to hear testimony by an *Enquirer* reporter and a Cincinnati described by one committee member as a 'turncoat Communist.' The reporter was James Ratliff, who has been writing about Communism in Cincinnati. The former Communist was Cecil Scott, who accompanied Mr. Ratliff to Washington. A committee member said Mr. Ratliff was turned down because of the committee's impression that he had no personal knowledge and could offer only 'hearsay evidence.' Mr. Scott was turned down, the committee member said, because of reports he once was in a mental institution. . . ."

Since the *Enquirer* had never identified its informant and had also neglected to publish the fact that Scott and Ratliff had gone to Washington to testify, the paper's position was not altogether enviable. Nor was it improved as the story unfolded.

During the next few days, the *Times-Star* and the *Post* told of Scott's periodic confinements in Longview, a local mental hospital, and of his attempt, apparently on his own, to testify before the Un-American Activities Committee in 1949. (The fact that he is also a convicted forger was not published





until some weeks later.) "It developed that the committee had questioned this man last year," the *Times-Star* reported, "had found him 'a very unreliable source of information' and saw no reason for hearing him again."

For a few days, the *Enquirer* reacted like a man who has been hit with an uppercut that had started at knee level. By Sunday, however, it had decided upon its defense. It yelled "Foul!" The refusal of the committee to hear Scott, it seems, had nothing to do with his credibility as a witness. The two competing papers were at fault:

"First the Cincinnati *Post* . . . and then the *Times-Star*," the *Enquirer* said in its lead editorial, "lent themselves to a publicity blitzkrieg that couldn't have been better organized if the Communists' own Committee for Agitation and Propaganda had planned it. Reporters descended upon the House committee preparing to sit in executive session, demanding to see the 'super secret agent' in such a way as to make the Committee counsel suspect the whole matter was a publicity stunt. . . . The *Daily Worker* scarcely could have been more enthusiastic than our afternoon contemporaries and their radio stations when a hitch developed in presenting the evidence to the committee!"

Mr. Ratliff's series also came to an end on this Sunday, although there was no relationship between this fact and the Washington incident. In his final piece, which was devoted largely to urging passage of the Mundt bill, there was one curious paragraph: "J. Edgar Hoover's men are forbidden by regulation to give information from

their files to anyone, a very necessary ruling, painful as has been the result. Investigation of Communism is political intelligence work, and the FBI must bend over backwards to avoid harming any individual for his political beliefs." Apparently the *Enquirer* feels there is no such obligation upon a daily newspaper.

The *Enquirer* was still doubled up and pleading for aid from the referee on the following Tuesday. Under the heading *SMEAR CONTINUES*, it reprinted editorials from the *Times-Star*, *Post*, and the *C.I.O. Sun*, a weekly paper. To any except the glazed eyes of the *Enquirer*, these essays—including the *Sun's*—were mild, almost gentle, reproofs. Both the *Times-Star* and the *Post* reminded their adversary that their business was reporting news, and that a Congressional committee's refusal to hear testimony of local men was well within their province. The *Times-Star* added that Communism ". . . is a deadly serious business, which should never be made the vehicle for a newspaper circulation stunt."

Nixon Denton, sports editor of the *Times-Star*, did offer some advice in his column, "Second Thoughts": "If the menace is as great as the *Enquirer* contends, then it should risk its all to destroy the menace, regardless of libel suits, and I do not say this jestingly. . . . Certainly it would be better to go down fighting, losing a press here and a linotype there through court orders than to wake up some morning and discover Mr. Gubitchev had returned from Russia and was giving out assignments in the news room."

Mr. Denton's suggestion was ignored. Instead, the *Enquirer* urged its readers

to sign a petition which appeared on the front page of the paper over a period of several weeks. This document asked that "... the names of Cincinnati Communists be exposed before the proper investigating authority in Washington . . ." When a reported ten thousand signatures were gathered, Mr. Ratliff was delegated to take the bundle to Washington. Between July 12 and July 28, the House committee subpoenaed a number of witnesses—not including Cecil Scott or Mr. Ratliff—and the investigation began.

The *Enquirer's* witnesses included a man and wife who were paid informants for the FBI in 1940-1941, a former secretary of the local United Electrical Workers union, and several others. Among them, they placed upon the record as Communists the names of about seventy persons who live or did live in Cincinnati.

It is highly difficult to ascertain definitely how many still reside in the city, since addresses and occupations frequently were not given, and such testimony as "an elderly couple named Wallison" was not especially helpful. A "Hyman Cohen" was named, also without further identification, and the phones of the local papers were kept busy with calls from men of that name, each denying that he was the person named in Washington. Part of the confusion, of course, stemmed from the fact that the two ex-FBI informants were testifying about events that had taken place a decade ago.

Although Cecil Scott, the *Enquirer's* top informant, was not called by the Committee, he did testify. Chairman John S. Wood promised that anyone

named as a Communist would be given an opportunity to be heard, and, since Scott was one of those mentioned, he demanded the right to take the stand. The committee listened to him for five days—but in closed session. Presumably, Scott gave the full list of 178 names referred to in the series of articles. So far, none of Scott's testimony has been made public, apparently because of his dubious background as a convicted forger and an inmate of a mental institution. The *Enquirer* is still pressing for the release of the Scott transcript, but it is by no means certain that the paper will be successful.

There are a number of effects of the *Enquirer* story which could be explored—its impact upon the community and upon those who claim they were falsely named, for example—but even more important is the precedent set by a Congressional committee when it acted as a newspaper's libel-proof sounding board. At a time when a democratic nation is attempting to balance protection of the right of political unorthodoxy on one side and security against a potential Fifth Column on the other, an invitation to vigilante action can be calamitous.

The story of the mechanics and operations of the Communist Party within a community is certainly legitimate—if not exactly novel—coverage for a newspaper. But a paper is intruding dangerously far into the fields of law-making and law enforcement when it hides behind the wall of Congressional immunity and fires a barrage of publicity at men and women named as Communists by nonofficial investigators.

The FBI has had the Communist Party under scrutiny for many years, and, according to spokesmen, the names of all members are safely in the files. J. Edgar Hoover needs the aid of a mob of hysterical head-hunters about as much as General MacArthur needs fifty thousand Camp Fire Girls, armed with songbooks, in Korea. It is doubtful that Mr. Hoover is deeply grateful for the collaborative help of the Cincinnati *Enquirer* and the Un-American Activities Committee, and what his reaction will be if the *Enquirer* formula becomes popular with a number of newspapers is any man's guess.

—JAMES A. MAXWELL

Sore Spots in the U. N.

1. Asia

The shadow of Asia hangs over the present session of the United Nations General Assembly. This session has been referred to by delegates, Secretariat members, and other observers as the most crucial that the United Nations has had to face in its five-year history. The usually optimistic Trygve Lie went so far as to admit, in his last Secretary-General's report, that "... it is not possible to be confident about the future of the United Nations. . . ."

The Korean conflict has brought the struggle between the United States and the U.S.S.R. to a climax within the framework of the world organization. During the month of August, the Soviet Union effectively stopped any new Security Council action on Korea and called illegal all decisions taken in the absence of the Soviet delegate. In the view of many diplomats, the Kremlin has now recognized the political mistake it had made in being absent at a time when it could have stopped all U.N. action on Korea.

Now that the Russians have returned, it appears that they will stay, at least during this session of the Assembly. Some western delegates expect that the Soviet Union will use to the maximum the forum of the United Nations in order to conquer with propaganda the ground it has not won through armed assault. In speech after speech, Jacob Malik has appealed to the Asian peoples, "exposing imperialist policies" and contrasting the "exploitation" of the colonial peoples by the West with the "progress" brought by "socialism."

The western diplomats will not have an easy time convincing delegates from the newly born Asian nations that the era of colonialism is dead, and that the former master intends to be a friend. Asia wants to sever all ties with the old colonialism. It claims the right to es-

tablish régimes that represent its peoples; it demands acceptance of these governments with no reservations for maintaining western "rights."

All of these aspirations come to a head in one of the main issues confronting this General Assembly: Who shall represent China? Pandit Nehru has made it clear that Chiang Kai-shek's government is unacceptable as the representative of the 450 million Chinese on the mainland. The question of the Peking government's admission into the United Nations is, for Nehru and the 330 million other Indians for whom he speaks, organically tied with the major problem confronting his continent. On this issue, India has placed itself squarely behind the U.S.S.R.

The contention of the Asians that the question of China will have to be solved before the U.N. can even begin to tackle the larger problems of the future of Asia will receive wholehearted support from several European delegations, foremost among them the British and the Yugoslavs.

The British Foreign Office, which recognized Communist China in January, appears to be convinced that keeping the Peking régime away from the U.N. means playing right into Moscow's hands.

The Yugoslav position is even more pronounced. Dr. Edvard Kardelj, chief of Belgrade's Foreign Office, will undoubtedly urge the West to admit the régime which the Yugoslavs believe represents the Chinese people. The Yugoslavs know from experience that one of the most dangerous weapons at Stalin's disposal in his attempts to subjugate the countries in his sphere is their isolation.

The Chinese question will come before the Assembly probably the very first day. According to precedents es-

established by the Russians since last January, we can expect the Russian delegate to demand, as a preliminary "point of order," that the Assembly eject from its midst the representatives of the Formosa government. The battle for Asia will start then. The Soviet delegate will address himself to the sixteen member nations which have established diplomatic relations with Peking. He will certainly carry the fight into the Credentials Committee, which must decide if the delegates present have the power to represent their countries. It is safe to predict that the conflict over the Chinese Communists will not end there. Already, the Peking Foreign Minister, Chou En-lai, has raised the question of "United States aggression against China," and if the debate on this complaint goes to the General Assembly it may take the better part of the session. Because it has provoked considerable disunity in the West, the Chinese question presents the greatest danger that the non-Communist world will lose the political struggle for Asia.

It must be realized that the Soviets are usually realistic enough to adjust their policy to "historical necessities." One good example of this adaptability, in the case of Asia, is the Soviet stand on Indonesia. The Russians denounced the formation of the new state of Indonesia in violent terms. During the last General Assembly, the Soviets took turns calling the Indonesian independence agreement "a deal signed behind the back of the Indonesian people by the expansionist circles of the United States and Great Britain on one side and Indonesian feudalists on the other." But the other Asian nations approved the agreement and welcomed the new state.

Soon after last year's Assembly meeting, the Indonesian government sent L. N. Palar, its spokesman at the United Nations, to Moscow. As a result of his negotiations, the United States of Indonesia was assured by the Soviet Union that it would not block the application of the new state for United Nations membership. Now Indonesia hesitates to apply for membership because it fears the veto of another permanent member—Nationalist China—because Indonesia has followed the lead of other Asian nations in recognizing the Chinese Communists.

As far as Asia is concerned, it is the West, by insisting on Nationalist China's right to its seat, which is responsible for keeping out Indonesia. And Soviet Russia is in the position of being able to claim that it shapes its policy to the wishes of the Asian people.

If and when the preliminary question of Chinese representation is solved, the West can come forward with concrete proposals for helping the rest of Asia. It is on this issue of "assistance versus exploitation" that the Asian peoples will judge us—when there is a basic change in western policy toward the economically backward countries.

To use the words of one member of the United Nations Secretariat, "Dollars are important, but dollars are not enough." There is no place in such a program, says this official, for an attempt to "impose a way of life" on the beneficiaries of economic assistance. Those who desire to help the underdeveloped countries must take into account the aspirations of these peoples for reforms, particularly agrarian reforms. They must give the assisted a feeling of "mutuality," and not confer upon them the inferiority complex of the indigent toward his benefactor.

In the organs and committees of the United Nations, the Soviets have always claimed that capitalism is incapable of combining political and economic freedom. And they say that while "socialism" demands some restrictions on individual liberty, it compensates by offering in return "freedom from want." The countries of Asia will wait during this General Assembly for the capitalist West to show if it can offer at the same time bread and freedom.

Does the future of the United Nations really hang in the balance at this fall's session? It cannot be denied that the average newspaper reader today has the impression that the world is on the eve of a new general conflict. But the Assembly of 1948 opened at a time when the western airlift was defying Soviet pressure in Berlin.

On September 23, 1949, a few days after the beginning of the fourth regular session of the General Assembly, President Truman announced that the United States government had proof of Russia's possession of the atomic bomb. And when the debates in the Assembly on the problem of atomic



Wide World

Nasrollah Entezam of Iran

control ended in a deadlock, when the Chinese Nationalists brought their complaint against the Soviet Union to the Assembly, some people would have hesitated to predict a bright future for the organization. Many an experienced statesman, including Trygve Lie, feared that when the Tito-Stalin clash ended in the Yugoslavs' election to the Security Council, Stalin would withdraw his representatives from a group that gave aid and comfort to his bitterest enemy.

This year's Soviet boycott brought about the most serious crisis the organization has yet faced. Then came Korea, and the United Nations showed that it no longer was a mere debating forum. So the Soviets have returned.

War and aggression do not make good propaganda for peace. Reports from Scandinavia tell of hundreds and thousands of persons who had signed the Stockholm Peace Appeal and then withdrawn their signatures—after the Korean aggression. What is true in the Scandinavian countries may be true elsewhere. And Moscow, on the basis of a world-wide indignation that has meant the loss of Henry Wallace in America and that made the neutral Nehru side with the United States in condemning the Korean action, has decided that the speaking platform of the General Assembly is practically indispensable.

In any case, the fact that the Soviet Union and its satellites have decided



Wide World

Zafarullah Khan of Pakistan

to attend this fall's session gives a more concrete sense to the words written by Trygve Lie, when Jacob Malik himself had already booked passage for a home leave which was expected to be final. At that time Lie said: "It is impossible to be hopeless."

—PETER ALLEN

2. Spain

The Soviet bloc in the United Nations, always quick to exploit any cause that serves to embarrass the United States, has declared itself the uncompromising champion of Spanish democracy, while the United States has been driven along a curious line of retreat from its early denunciations of the Madrid government toward a benevolent neutrality. The possibility of a loan to Franco brings the U.S. only a step away from outright collaboration with Franco's undemocratic régime.

The outriders of Falangist Spain are looking forward hopefully to this fall's General Assembly. The Dominican Republic, through its delegate, Dr. Max Henríquez-Ureña, has placed "Relations of Member States of the United Nations with Spain" on the agenda, and two of Franco's other Latin friends, Peru and Bolivia, have circulated a resolution which is aimed at rejecting the unfriendly things the U.N. has said about Franco in the past. They cannot hope yet, of course, for the ad-

mission of Franco as a fully accredited working U.N. member. That was specifically barred by a resolution at San Francisco in 1945. But they do hope to rescind the General Assembly resolution of December 12, 1946, which recommended "that all Members of the United Nations immediately recall from Madrid their ambassadors and ministers plenipotentiary accredited there."

Since the first meeting of the United Nations, the Soviets, usually through their Polish spokesman, have made the Spanish question a weapon in their propaganda arsenal. In April, 1946, while the Security Council was meeting at Hunter College in New York, Dr. Oscar Lange, the Polish delegate, brought up the Franco problem under Articles 34 and 35 of the Charter, as a "situation which . . . presents a serious danger to the maintenance of international peace and security." His speech was disappointing to the pro-Loyalists who heard him. Instead of using the ample documentation available to him about the totalitarian methods of Franco's régime, he launched into the rather improbable theory that Franco was plotting world conquest with the aid of Nazi scientists.

After Lange's speech, the delegation of Australia suggested forming a five-member subcommittee to prepare a report on the Spanish question. Six weeks later, the subcommittee recommended to the Security Council that unless the Franco régime withdrew, or conditions of political freedom were restored, "a resolution be passed . . . recommending that diplomatic relations with the Franco régime be terminated by each Member of the United Nations."

To the surprise of the whole Council, perhaps even to the surprise of Andrei Gromyko, the resolution was vetoed by the Soviet Union. Up to the last moment the Soviet delegate's instructions had been to support the subcommittee's resolution. But when the vote was taken, Gromyko told the subcommittee it had drawn false conclusions. The Soviets, who would sometimes rather bay the moon for the impossible than get what is practicable, supported an alternative Polish resolution demanding an immediate diplomatic break. This resolution failed to pass, and the Council shoved the Span-

ish question under the blotter until the end of October, when it voted to turn its records and documents over to the General Assembly.

Immediately, Belgium, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Norway, and Venezuela moved for discussion of the Franco case in the Assembly—a debate which resulted in the Assembly's resolution of December 12, 1946, calling for the withdrawal of chiefs of missions in Madrid, and also for Franco's exclusion from all specialized agencies and all "conferences or other activities" of the United Nations.

It should be pointed out that some of the earliest opposition to Franco in the United Nations came from Catholic countries. In 1946, Belgium was a leader in the Assembly attack on Franco. No one spoke out more vehemently than Georges Bidault of France. One of the signers of the subcommittee's report to the Security Council on Franco was Pedro Leão Velloso, a Brazilian whose first public utterance in the Security Council was a refusal to work on Good Friday.

When the Third General Assembly met in Paris in September, 1948, Poland came armed with another bristling resolution in condemnation of Franco. A Latin-American group came equipped with an equally fierce denunciation of the decision taken in 1946. At this point the British Foreign Office floated a trial balloon which reduced both the right and the left extremes in the Assembly to utter confusion. The plan was to work through the army and the royalist opposition in Spain, bringing in the Vatican, if possible, to set up a limited constitutional monarchy. Don Juan was to occupy the throne, and the provisional government was to be a coalition headed by the right-wing Socialist Indalecio Prieto and the Catholic exile Gil Robles. Gil Robles and Prieto took pains to deny any connection with this strategem, and the Foreign Office withdrew with a graceful shrug.

According to gossip current in Paris at the time, Juliusz Katz-Suchy of Poland and Dr. José Arce of Argentina agreed that both sides would hold their fire until the spring. When the Assembly convened at Flushing Meadow in the spring of 1949, Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, and Peru sponsored a resolution which called on the As-



Above: the 'hot corner' of the Security Council. Below: Malik, Jebb, and Austin

sembly to decide "without prejudice to the declarations contained in the resolution of 12 December, 1946, to leave member states full freedom of action as regards their diplomatic relations with Spain." This resolution passed in committee and got twenty-six votes in the Assembly—not enough to win, but a clear indication that opinion was shifting. Of the Latin bloc, only Guatemala, Mexico, Panama, and Uruguay voted against it. There was a sizable list of abstainers, including the United States.

A Polish resolution, introduced by Katz-Suchy, was rejected in committee. What damned the Polish resolution, which recommended merely that member nations "forthwith cease to export to Spain arms and ammunition," was Katz-Suchy's attitude, which confirmed the impression in the minds of many delegates that the anti-Franco cause was strictly a Communist bandwagon. Katz-Suchy charged that Britain had contracted to supply Franco with Rolls-Royce airplane engines. Hector McNeil, the adroit British dele-

gate, had no trouble proving that his government had refused to countenance that order. And, much to Katz-Suchy's chagrin, McNeil went a step further and told the Assembly that Franco had arranged the previous November to purchase five hundred Jumo engines and propellers—from Poland.

Because of their very persistence, the Soviets have had some success with their tactics on the Franco question. Moderates among the Spanish exiles may be embarrassed by such support, but a few have edged over toward the left to meet their sponsors on common ground. The effect on Franco's opposition inside Spain can only be guessed. Communists working in the underground must surely have dinned their own version of the facts into the minds of other anti-Franco Spaniards. The active flirtations of western politicians with Franco have helped the Soviets immensely with their propaganda.

Most North Atlantic Pact nations react with alarm to hints that American strategists might take their stand

behind the Pyrenees in an all-out war, rather than along the Elbe, the Rhine, or the English Channel.

And yet the anti-Franco indignation which was widespread among democratic countries just after the war seems to have simmered down. France is too preoccupied with Communist pressures within and without to invite trouble on the Spanish border. The British Labour government, devoutly anti-Franco by its platform, is in a delicate position; when the war ended and austerity did not, a brisk trade was begun with Spain on the premise that olive oil, oranges, and nitrates took precedence over ideologies.

In a battle over Franco in the U.N., Britain and France may feel obliged to look the other way when Latin-American enthusiasts try to get the Franco condemnation off the books. The response of the United States may be even warmer. Then if the Arab states strike one of their characteristic bargains with the Latins, any sort of resolution might go through.

—WALTER O'HEARN

Dianetics: 'Astounding Science'

A few weeks ago I lay on an Army cot in a loft building in Elizabeth, New Jersey. An intent young man sitting beside me was saying, "When I count to seven your eyes will close. You will be entirely aware of what is going on and will be able to remember clearly everything that has occurred during this session. At no time will you be unconscious or unable to halt what is going on."

"One, two, three, four, five, six, seven. At the end of this session I will say the word 'canceled.' When I do, any suggestion that I have made during the session will be without force and will have no effect on you."

"Now," briskly, "go back to the time you had your tonsillectomy at the age of four. What do you get?"

"Nothing."

"Where would you be?"

"In a hospital. In Philadelphia."

"What is it like in the hospital?"

"I don't know."

"Take that 'I don't know' and try it again."

"I don't know. I don't know."

"Continue."

"I don't know. I don't know. I don't know."

And so for two hours. The questions concerned my feelings and experiences during the tonsillectomy and during an unspecified and unidentifiable experience some time before. I felt like a man lying supine on a hot afternoon, disturbed only mildly by a fly that kept lighting on his ear and asking questions.

At the end, the intent young man said: "You will now come to present time. Canceled. When I count from five backwards you will open your eyes. Five, four, three . . ." My eyes opened.

This odd session was anything but unique. All over the country "tens of thousands" of men and women are

having similar—but more rewarding—experiences, if one can believe the statements of the entrepreneurs of the new "science" of dianetics.

The chief claims for this new science are simple and somewhat comprehensive: "Dianetics (Gr. *dianoua*—thought) is the science of mind. Far simpler than physics or chemistry, it compares to them in the exactness of its axioms and is on a considerably higher echelon of usefulness. *The hidden source of all psychosomatic ills and human aberrations has been discovered and skills have been developed for their invariable cure.*" Further, by the use of dianetic techniques, "the psychiatrist, psychoanalyst and intelligent layman can successfully and invariably treat all psychosomatic ills and inorganic aberrations."

Dianetics—the first "science" to be developed in 1950—was announced to the world early this spring in a sixteen-thousand-word article that appeared in *Astounding Science Fiction*, which usually devotes itself to time travel and love among the asteroids. Following this initial publication there appeared *Dianetics: The Modern Science of Mental Health*, by L. Ron Hubbard (Hermitage House, \$4).

L. (for Lafayette) Ron (for Ronald) Hubbard is the sole author and architect of dianetics. Before he invented his new science, this tall, red-headed "mathematician and theoretical philosopher" had been best known as a writer of pulp and adventure fiction. His listing in *Who's Who in the East* indicates that he is also a graduate civil engineer, a leader of expeditions to the Caribbean and Alaska, a licensed commercial glider pilot, a master of sailing vessels, a Marine Corps veteran, and a radio operator. He is thirty-nine.

From the moment of its first announcement the success of dianetics has

been formidable. Some fifty readers of *Astounding Science Fiction* wrote to the editor after the appearance of the article, and over two thousand sent orders to Hermitage House for the book. *Dianetics*—known among dianeticists simply as "The Book"—has sold more than sixty thousand copies, and is being translated into Japanese, French, German, and Scandinavian.

Institutionally, dianetics has made great strides. On June 2, the Hubbard Dianetic Research Foundation opened its doors in Elizabeth, and branches have since been established in New York, Washington, Chicago, Los Angeles, and Honolulu, with more in the offing. The branches and the parent institution serve as clinics and information centers, while research and teaching activities are confined to the New Jersey establishment.

As a nonprofit organization, the foundation has a good solid financial basis. It collects all of Hubbard's royalties on "The Book," and in return pays him a salary as president and director of research. Associate memberships cost fifteen dollars a year. There are currently over a thousand associates and the roster increases daily. The foundation also gives three courses in dianetics: a one-month course which "leads to professional certification" for five hundred dollars; a series of fifteen lectures "for teams of two who plan to co-audit [treat] each other" at \$350 a team or two hundred each; and a two-hour "case opening" for pairs who plan to treat each other—fifty dollars.


Just what is dianetics? Hubbard's own exposition runs 410 pages, not counting appendices, and, although badly organized, rambling, and discursive, contains a great deal of material. The greatly simplified summary that follows is the work of Frederick L. Schuman, Woodrow Wilson Professor

of Government at Williams College, an enthusiastic convert.

"The Mind of Man is a calculating machine. It operates on three levels. The 'Analytical Mind' is rational, logical, reality-orientated, and always capable of coming out with correct answers on the basis of the data it receives. The 'Reactive Mind' files and retains pain and painful emotions and seeks to direct the organism solely on a stimulus-response basis. It 'thinks' only in identities. The 'Somatic Mind' achieves solutions on the physical level, directed by the Analytical or Reactive Mind. All 'aberrations' (allergies, psycho-somatic diseases, neuroses and psychoses not of structural or organic origin) have a single cause: 'engrams' which are cellular (not neurone) recordings of experience when the Analytical Mind is shut down, in full or in part, by 'unconsciousness' (analytical attenuation) through shock or pain or painful emotion. There is no 'unconsciousness' in the old sense. All experience is recorded indelibly. But the data in the Reactive-Mind-Memory-Bank are inaccessible to the Analytical-Mind-Memory-Bank. These data are the source of all aberrations, since they motivate behavior without the knowledge of the victim.

"Aberrations can be cured by tracking down the engrams and transferring them, through 'repeater technique,' into the Analytical-Mind-Memory-Bank. This is possible for the first time through the 'Dianetic reverie,' which differs from the psychoanalytical autistic reverie in that the directives are standardized and aimed at specific targets. It differs from hypnosis in that the patient is fully conscious at all times and the auditor issues no suggestions or commands (apart from those necessary to avoid hypnosis). The major engrams are infantile and pre-natal. They are 'keyed-in' and reactivated in later life by other experiences which 'recall' the initial experience.

"Lift' the engrams, especially 'basic-basic' (the first pre-natal), and all aberrations of a non-structural character disappear. This is possible through 'returning' in reverie on the 'time track' to areas of memory hitherto unsuspected, and transferring to . . . full awareness the engramic experiences of which the Analytical Mind has no knowledge. Dianetic therapy, says Hubbard, can thus cure all functional aberrations



L. Ron Hubbard

and transform the patient into a 'release' (one who is free from anxiety) or, in optimum terms, into a 'clear' (one who is permanently cured of, and henceforth immune to, all aberrations). A 'clear' has all experience data at the disposal of the analytical mind, can 'return' to any previous experience, and is in the fullest sense 'master of his fate and captain of his soul.'"

Regarding criticism, the dianeticists have what they consider an airtight argument. If a layman questions or criticizes dianetics, his opposition is regarded as "engramic"—that is, it is his engrams talking and therefore means nothing. If the opponent happens to be a professional psychologist, the dianetic position is that he is afraid the new science will take the bread out of his mouth.

But whether the opponents of dianetics are motivated by engrams, avarice, or a simple love of truth, they have a few fairly cogent points to make: Hubbard and his followers claim that dianetics is a completely new synthesis, a new idea comparable to the discovery of fire or atomic fission. In practice the dianeticists take some rather long detours to sneer at hypnotists from Mesmer on down, at Pavlov, and at Freud. In point of fact, it is precisely from these sources that Hubbard has synthesized dianetics.

The general dianetic theory that the mind is swayed by unconscious memories of painful incidents in the past is almost pure Freud—simplified and jazzed up with references to electronics, but still Freud. The method of dianetic therapy that Hubbard has "discovered" (nullifying painful past experiences by remembering them) is exactly the method used by every psychoanalyst from the old master on down. From Pavlov dianetics has borrowed entire the mechanism of the conditioned reflex to account for the cumulative effect of engrams through restimulation. Hubbard's description of "reverie" matches classic descriptions of a light hypnotic trance, and, by his own account, subjects who have previously been hypnotized tend to progress from dianetic reverie into definite hypnotic trance states.

During the last hundred years hypnosis has often been used as a treatment for both mental and physical ailments, and psychiatrists and psychoanalysts

still employ the technique as an adjunct to other forms of therapy. The experience of all workers in the field is that hypnosis can "cure" almost anything from athlete's foot to schizophrenia temporarily—but that it can never effect an actual permanent cure. The results claimed by the dianeticists may be closely related to this fact, for as far as it is possible to tell, none of their cases have been followed and checked over any extended period.

The dianetics school contends that its therapists, or "auditors," avoid hypnosis by being careful never to give any suggestions to their subjects during reverie and, as an added safeguard, issue a specific command to cancel the post-reverie effect of any suggestions made accidentally. It is a little difficult to understand why such measures are necessary if reverie is not hypnotic. And it is still more difficult to understand the difference between routine dianetic commands ("return to the prenatal area" or "contact the last painful experience that you had") and the "suggestions" of a hypnotist.

If Mr. Hubbard and his disciples are reluctant to admit the sources of their doctrine, they appear even more unwilling to present the extraordinary results which they claim for dianetic therapy in any verifiable form. *Dianetics* is supposedly based on the results of some 270 cases of mental and physical illnesses, all successfully cured, but "The Book" contains no single adequate case history.

There exists a similar reticence about "clears," those remarkable products of dianetic therapy gifted with supernormal mental powers, limitless memory, and immunity to the common cold. The powers which the doctrine ascribes to "clears" should be apparent even to the casual layman. But none of these remarkable characters seem to be on display. "There are plenty of them around," I was told, "but they don't want to make a show of themselves. No, Hubbard himself isn't a 'clear.'"

"What's the use of case histories?" the dianeticists ask. "You can prove this for yourself. The authorities in the field are either stupid or venal. Try it yourself and be convinced."

"Do it yourself" is, indeed, the chief burden of the dianeticists' song. Any person of average intelligence can practice dianetics. You and your fam-

ily or your friends can cure each other. You can prove to yourself that dianetics works. The appeal is a shrewd one, combining the allure of the factory-outlet store ("save the middleman's profit") and of the million and one books on how to make your own lampshades. From a sales point of view dianetics is a natural: It not only works for everyone, but it works every time.

Under the circumstances, it is distressing to report some exceptions. The writer has repeatedly tried to prove the workability of dianetic technique both as subject and "auditor." The attempts included a session with a trained auditor and a number of trials with other people. In no case was dianetic reverie established. In no case was the subject able to dredge up a perception or incident which he had not consciously remembered. In no case was it possible to recreate anything remotely resembling an engram. This failure is the more embarrassing since, in the terms of Hubbard's book, it indicates that the writer suffers from either a serious mental derangement or a simple lack of intelligence.

From the point of view of social psychology the most interesting thing about dianetics is the way that the science has been tailored and manicured to have the widest possible appeal to U.S. citizens in the year 1950. Whether the presentation is studied or accidental, it could well serve as a model for advertising men and public-relations counselors.

Perhaps the subtlest bait that the dianeticists have laid out in front of the public is snob appeal. Hubbard's snobism is based on intellectual rather than on economic or social status and may best be summed up in his own words:

"There is a direct ratio between the brilliance of a mind and its ability to understand and work dianetics. . . . Out of this comes whatever we do or might wish to do to prevent it, an aristocracy of the mind. . . . One sees with some sadness that more than three-

quarters of the world's population will become subject to the remaining quarter as a natural consequence and about which we can do exactly nothing. The saving part of this is that the good will of the upper quarter will inhibit their exploitation of the less fortunate."

On the basis of these appeals, future social psychologists will be able to make interesting comparisons between the dianetics craze and a number of similar phenomena: the hydrotherapy hysteria of the 1840's; Charcot's much-publicized hypnotic therapy in the 1880's; and Coué's doctrine of auto-suggestion which swept Europe and America in the early 1920's.

While the social psychologists are examining dianetics from their point of view, the clinical psychologists will also have their innings. One interesting subject will be the paranoid tendencies of the entire dianetics movement and their relationship to the personality of Hubbard. The tendencies are abundantly evident. The movement shows a strong sense of persecution in its continued insistence that it is under attack by Entrenched Authority. The Messianic belief that dianetics and dianetics alone can save the world is in entire agreement with classical descriptions of paranoia and paranoid psychoses in which similar delusions play a prominent part.

To the clinical psychologist, the psychopathology of the dianetics movement is of less immediate concern than the immediate harm that dianetics can do to those who practice it. Neurotic or badly balanced personalities who are being or will be exposed to a misunderstood form of hypnotic therapy administered by amateurs or by "professionals" with a month of training are sooner or later going to be candidates for intensive psychiatric treatment in a more conventional form. Similarly, the men and women who took up their beds and walked after dianetics had "cured" them of their physical ailments will later have to put down their beds and lie on them under competent medical care.

As one sour doctor of medicine and psychology has remarked, "Mr. Hubbard tells them to prove to themselves that they can cure themselves by dianetics. For six months they'll have the proof—and we'll be picking up after the dianetics crowd for years."

—CHRISTOPHER GEROULD



Policy Before Propaganda

One observer's program for winning the minds of Asia's people

When war broke out in Korea on June 25, the State Department brought off a diplomatic coup of rare brilliance. For the first time, perhaps, since Woodrow Wilson's day, it took the propaganda initiative away from its adversary. By perceiving that this was not a U.S.A.-U.S.S.R. affair but a *casus foederis* implicating the United Nations as a whole, by resting its case not on American assertions but on the reports of a U.N. commission, by enrolling General MacArthur under the flag of the U.N., it cut the ground from beneath the feet of the "third-force" type of anti-Americanism. It saw instantly that here was the first dramatic occasion since 1945 when all the free nations without exception would be summoned to choose, not between the Soviet Union and the United States, but between the Soviet Union and the United Nations. It acted; fifty-two governments chose the United Nations.

The propaganda effect was irresistible. In England, Aneurin Bevan, the most popular of the left-wing Labour leaders, and hitherto a severe critic of the United States, lined up with us. In France the Socialist Party, which had consistently joined the Communists in their clamor for the withdrawal of French troops from Indo-China, voted supplementary war credits. In our own country, Henry Wallace broke with the party whose Presidential candidate he had been, and declared himself against the Soviet Union.

For five weeks we dwelt in this blissful state—of whose novelty, incidentally, only the cloistered advisers of General MacArthur seem to have been unaware. Then, on August 1, the Soviet delegate inaugurated his month in the presidency of the U.N. Security Council. He could not, of course, reverse the decisions of the Council that form the basis of U.N. action in Korea. But in

four afternoons of perverse and contemptuous disregard of every truth, four days of cynical and monotonous insistence upon a Soviet-style "peace" in Korea, Mr. Malik shattered this united front. He restored the psychological *status quo ante*. He returned world issues to their earlier form of question: U.S.A. or U.S.S.R.? He re-imposed upon the imagination of the world—and particularly of the Far East—the United States as symbol and archetype of western imperialism.

Three New York Times headlines demonstrate how swift was his success. As early as Sunday, August 6, James Reston's summary of the position was entitled U.N. SCORE: WE WON VOTES, THEY WON PROPAGANDA. Three days later the head on Richard Johnston's dispatch from the Korean front read SEOUL PARTLY WON BY RED ARGUMENTS. On August 13 a front-page story from New Delhi by Robert Trumbull was headed ANTI-U.S. FEELING IS ON RISE IN INDIA. Goebbels, were he alive, would take off his hat to Mr. Malik.

The American press was naturally

not oblivious to Malik's triumph, nor to the nature of that triumph. The two heaviest guns of the New York Times—Reston and Arthur Krock—were turned on the subject of propaganda. Reston had his own answer: "Every hour of radio time we have in Asia . . . would undoubtedly be much more effective if used by and in the name of the United Nations instead of in our own name." Very sound—and very reminiscent of the mouse's proposal that a bell be tied around the cat's neck. Reston himself saw that. He saw and said that "history and suspicions of the capitalist world in Asia are against us"; that the member nations of the U.N. could have only relative faith in the sincerity of our blasts against tyranny while Congress was engaged in voting a large loan to Franco. Yet Reston was on the right track.

Arthur Krock, wondering aloud how to win friends for the Voice of America, recalled that American ideals were once served by such persuasive talents as Franklin, Jefferson, and Tom Paine; and he asked where like talents were to be found today. His own search did not lead him into quite the same moral and intellectual regions. What is wanted, he decided, is someone who shall possess "the technique of the advertising man modified by those of the diplomat and proficient news editor." It would be sad indeed if we had to confess that a nation whose spokesmen were once Franklin and Jefferson had been reduced to a nation whose ideals were now the formulations of account executives and circulation chasers; that all we could now summon in the way of the fervor and faith of a Tom Paine was slick slogans bred in the minds of ulcer-bearing bipeds whose habitat is the golf courses of Westchester County.



As for the diplomat, we had a sample of his inspiring prose on the Voice of America when the President of the United States inaugurated the first official broadcast to Indo-China. The copy written for Mr. Truman in the State Department was composed in language of which this is a fair specimen: "On this occasion, I wish to extend my greetings to the men and women of the Associated States of Indo-China and to your leaders who are working so that the Associated States within the French Union may take their place among the other free nations of the world." Ambassador Jesup, who followed the President, assured the Annamites that the Voice of America "is dedicated to the task of bringing the truth about what is happening in the world to the people all over the world"—thus, of course, addressing himself poignantly to anxieties that are uppermost in the Annamite mind.

But if we had a Franklin, a Jefferson, a Tom Paine to speak for us, what would he be free to say? On August 18, twenty-eight Senators—twelve Democrats and sixteen Republicans—signed a letter to President Truman in which they asked that the government embark upon an expanded "psychological and spiritual offensive against the Kremlin." They proposed that the Russian people be directly addressed in fraternal terms. "Let us tell the Russian people," they said, "that we want to live in peace with them and hope their rulers will not compel us to fight them. We would like to help them to get a better life from their rich soil, forests, and mines."

Unquestionably, this is a higher objective than would be aimed at by Krock's ideal propagandist. It requires no descent to the tricks and dodges that an advertising man would dream up; it is more thoughtful and more moral than any notion that could spring in the brain of a "proficient news editor"; it is more daring in conception than a diplomat could allow himself to be. As a counter "peace" offensive it has merit. It is believable, at least for older generations of foreigners, who would find it characteristic of the moralizing simple-mindedness of the America they once knew—Wilson's America, say.

But with all this, it misses the point. It puts the cart before the horse. In



too-characteristic American fashion, it draws a veil of good intent over a picture strewn with ugly fact. Above all, it repeats the persistent Congressional error of assuming that our primary, almost our sole, propaganda target ought to be the people of the Soviet Union. It ignores the dazzlingly clear fact that neither we nor the Russians can hope to convert each other—that both we and they are fighting a psychological war for the allegiance of third parties. It is all the world *except* Russia that we need to address with the highest possible degree of persuasiveness and on the deepest possible note of sympathy. In the eighth century A.D.—which affords a useful parallel—it would have been absurd of Charlemagne's grandfather, Charles Martel, to try to make Christians of the invading Moslems: The important thing would have been to persuade the Visigoths of Spain not to abjure Christianity and join with Islam against the rest of Christian Europe.

As soon as we realize that our primary propaganda targets must be what I have called "third parties," we come face to face with a plain and ugly fact—which is that in many parts of the world our government is supporting men who are unpopular with the masses of their countrymen.

This is not to argue that Mao's régime in China must of necessity turn

out better than Chiang's, or Ho Chi Minh's better than Bao Dai's in Indo-China, or the North Koreans' better than Syngman Rhee's, or a Huk chieftain's better than Quirino's at Manila. That is as the future may show. The fact at this moment is that the only propaganda line we can follow with success in the Far East is a line demonstrating our sympathy with the misery and the desires of the masses; and, further, that we are debarred from following that line because our Far Eastern political clients show no intent of bettering the condition of the masses—wherefore our protestations of good intent cannot possibly be believed.

In these circumstances, our official propagandists cannot do much besides broadcast "honest news" and vague politico-moral platitudes. Whatever may be the quality of the State Department's propagandists, the failure of our propaganda in the Far East is not to be laid at their door. It is our diplomacy, not our propaganda, that is at fault. And it is at fault because, so far as one can judge, it is exclusively a negative policy of "anti-Communism" and employs only negative instruments—men whose sole merit is that they are anti-Communist. It advertises no affirmative purpose except the academic and legalistic aim of setting up governments that shall be the product of a

majority vote—as if Korea, say, were a kind of Iowa with a low living standard. (There is, of course, a corollary plan—to bring in enough American foodstuffs and other consumption goods to induce people to maintain our “anti-Communist” clients in power.)

This division—Communist vs. anti-Communist—is not merely an oversimplification of the facts about Korea and Southeast Asia, it is unrealistic. The realities are these:


1. It is not the Europeans (and in the Philippines, the Americans) who are the worst exploiters of the people. The worst exploiters are three particularly despicable categories of Asians: the native feudal landowner, the Indian carpetbagging moneylender, and the Chinese carpetbagging merchant-moneylender.

2. While it is perfectly true that the Asian leaders and intellectuals are theoretically bent upon ejecting the European “intruders” from their lands, the Asian farmers and villagers are realistically intent upon getting rid of their non-European oppressors, the landowners and moneylenders whom they know by name and by immediate experience.

3. What the upcountry villagers want is not Marxism, of which they know nothing. They want to cease being sharecroppers and get out of their lifelong debt (incurred at rates in Indo-China, for instance, running up to 3,650 per cent per annum). They want credit co-operatives that will not lend exclusively to the big landowners but will reach down to the little fellow. They want marketing organizations that will pay them a fair price for their produce. They want a revival of the old village crafts, a restoration of a balanced village economy, a return to some semblance of a happy community life.

4. They are anti-American (and anti-European) not for ideological reasons but only because they see in us the supporters of those Asians who directly oppress and exploit them.

We have only to look at Soekarno's Indonesia and Thakin Nu's Burma to see that the conflict is not between Communism and anti-Communism but between exploitation and social justice. The Dutch have not been ruthlessly expropriated by the Indonesian



Republic; the British capitalists have not been robbed by the Republic of Burma. The business of getting rid of the European “intruder” has been handled with the greatest prudence in Southeast Asia, and neither India nor Pakistan has driven British capital beyond its frontiers.

This is why we may speak of the Asian intellectual's dislike of “white” enterprise as theoretical, and may concentrate on the upcountry farmer's misery and anxiety as the nub of the situation. The history of European or American exploitation serves the Kremlin as a propaganda argument; native Asian exploitation, backed by the United States government, is a far more serious matter, for it, of itself, drives the masses of little men over to the side of Moscow's clients. Compared with this, the fact that Chiang's entourage may be friendly with certain American banks, or Bao Dai's with the Banque de l'Indochine, is of small moment.


Thus the propaganda problem resolves itself into a problem of policy. It looks as if, here and there, we may be forced to switch from one Asian leader to another, just as in 1942 Mr. Churchill persuaded us to switch from the support of Mikhailovich to support of Tito. But whether we switch or not, we cannot go on much longer with-

out assuming the obligation to ensure that American aid shall not go exclusively to the families and cronies of our clients, but shall be equitably distributed to their peoples. This will mean setting up civil proconsuls with powers under a kind of condominium. It is interesting that we who are not reluctant to intervene abroad militarily should be so squeamish about intervening in civil affairs. What is wanted is not a mere consultative mission like Daniel Bell's in the Philippines, but close control of policy and administration. The kind of “sovereignty” that rests in the hands of a Syngman Rhee or a Bao Dai is not so sacrosanct in the eyes of the Koreans or the Indo-Chinese that the external authority which upholds it—American or French—need worry about “infringing” it.


It goes without saying that there is but one way to take the curse of “imperialism” from this inescapable course of action, and that is to pursue it under the aegis of the United Nations. It is to be hoped that, our November elections once past, the military precedent established in Korea may bear fruit on the civil side.

Until something like this is done, American propaganda to the Far East must remain ineffectual. It is a touching and sympathetic trait in us that we who invented modern advertising can lie to make a sale but cannot lie to promote the national interest. We are boastful, but we are not shameless. That is the real reason for our distaste for propaganda and our timid reliance upon “news” to tell our story. Our nature is such that we need to be sure that the promises we make will in fact be carried out before we can bring ourselves to make them. Once we have a policy that is clearly beneficial to the people we address, it ought not be too difficult to lay down an effective propaganda line. At that moment the United Nations and the United States together will be able to say frankly to the Far East what an Athenian ambassador said to the Sicilians 2,400 years ago: “If we are now here [in your country] it is in the interest of our security, with which your interest coincides. . . . We are compelled to interfere in much, because we have much to guard against.” Coming from the United Nations, the Far East will not receive such words in ill part.

—LEWIS GALANTIERE.



Russian weapons captured in Korea: Upper left, a 20-mm antitank rifle in a pile of small arms; upper right, an armored reconnaissance car; left center, automatic weapons; center right, a light antitank gun; lower left, a T-34 destroyed in battle; above, a Russian mortar shell bearing markings that indicate it was made in 1950



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